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I. Introduction
"Everyone has the right to have access to ... sufficient
food and water....",
With the above declaration, the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa distinguishes itself from most other Constitutions by
virtue of its express commitment to socioeconomic justice and
equality. Section 27, entitled "Health care, food, water and social
security," is one of thirty-three provisions listed in Chapter 2,
which enumerates the Constitution's Bill of Rights.2 Though the
text reads simply enough, delineating the true meaning of
"sufficient food and water" has revealed itself to be difficult in
practice.
The right to water, and perhaps more specifically, the state's
ability to restrict this right, has come under recent scrutiny in
Johannesburg, South Africa. In early July of 2006, the
Johannesburg High Court3 received an application filed by five
residents of Phiri, Soweto4 asking the Court to declare the
decisions of Johannesburg Water5 "to limit free basic water supply
to 6 kilolitres per household per month and to unilaterally install
1 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27 (emphasis added).
2 Id.
3 For a discussion of the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, see AIN
CURRIE & JOHAN DE WALL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 112 (5th ed. 2005)
[hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK].
4 To access application documents, see Centre for Applied Legal Studies,
University of the Witwatersrand School of Law, Phiri Water Rights Case Application,
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/index.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008). For an
overview of Soweto's demographics and history, see generally K. C. TESSENDORF,
ALONG THE ROAD TO SOWETO: A RACIAL HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1989).
5 For a company profile of Johannesburg Water, see Johannesburg Water,
http://www.johannesburgwater.co.za (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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prepayment meters" unconstitutional. 6 The five applicants sought
a compulsion order to be levied upon Johannesburg Water (Pty)
Ltd. to "provide a free basic water supply of 50 litres per person
per day, and the option of a credit-metered supply installed at the
cost of the City of Johannesburg, to the residents of Phiri,
Soweto." 7 The case was heard by the High Court in December of
2007, and a decision is expected sometime after the publication of
this article.
Before reaching the application before the High Court, I must
first discuss the basic human and legal right to water and its
constitutional assurance as provided by the South African Bill of
Rights. Careful analysis of the issues central to the complaint
requires a discussion of the evolution of the South African
Constitution (merely a decade into its existence); an analysis of
interpretive techniques for digesting what is a very liberal, and
often unworkably vague, Bill of Rights; and a review of
commentary regarding the fundamental nature of the right to
water. With this background in place, I will focus on the Phiri
water rights application itself and engage in speculative analysis
concerning the constitutionality of the prepaid water meter scheme
currently in operation.
The adoption of the South African Constitution nearly eleven
years ago was a momentous occasion for a new democratic South
Africa, but democratic constitutionalism' is not defined by its
birth, but rather, through its maturity. The members of the High
Court, and similar judicial outposts throughout South Africa, sit in
a position of powerful potential. The Constitution, absent
interpretation and implementation, merely represents transparent
promises and empty obligations. As the Phiri water rights case
6 Press Release, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the
Witwatersrand School of Law, Legal Challenge Over Water Policy in Poor Community
in Phiri, Soweto (July 12, 2006), http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/index.htm (follow
"Read Media Summary, 12 July 2006 (PDF)" hyperlink).
7 Id.
8 "Without true parliamentary government it is hollow to speak of 'a government
by the people and for the people.' Representative government is at the heart of
democracy and constitutionalism. Without it is idle to speak of the constitutional
protection of human rights." Welshman Ncube, Constitutionalism and Human Rights:
Challenges of Democracy, in THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 1, 14 (Pearson Nherere & Marina D'Engelbronner-Kolf eds., 1993).
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reflects, adding substance to the text requires a careful
understanding of the Constitution's history, objectives, and
accompanying legal responsibilities.
The City of Johannesburg can no longer escape its
constitutional duty. Both the historical provocation for the
socioeconomic protection provided by the Bill of Rights and the
developing international commitment to an enforceable human
right to water weigh in favor of finding for the Phiri applicants.
Evolving judicial precedent has reaffirmed the justiciability of
socioeconomic rights in South Africa. Jeopardizing the
Constitution's humanitarian impact further must remain an
unacceptable proposition. The prepaid water scheme should be
rendered unconstitutional.
II. History of the South African Constitution and
Understanding "Constitutionalism"
"WHEREAS there is a need to create a new order in
which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South
African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic
constitutional state in which there is equality between men
and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall
be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and
freedoms." 9
A Constitution is a people's document, "written to give effect
to the will of the people and it is supposed to have decisive
influence for good in their lives."' The long winding road
towards a South African Constitution in the mid-1990's must be
considered against the historical backdrop of enslavement,
disenfranchisement, and minority rule." When the Union of South
9 S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 pmbl. This interim Constitution was a transitional
Constitution that governed South Africa while an elected Constitutional Assembly
drafted the final Constitution. DION BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION 1
(rev. ed. 1995).
10 BASSON, supra note 9, at xix.
I1 Id. Beginning in the 1650's, the Dutch began to colonize the southern-most tip
of Africa, soon followed by the French and British. Id. By the 1830's, the British were
engaged in warfare with indigenous factions, and the Afrikaners (Boers) gradually
conquered and moved inland towards the North, depriving indigenous people of their
land and rights along the way. Id. at xix-xx. For a general historical perspective of the
events leading up to the adoption of the interim Constitution, see id. at xx-xxiv.
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Africa was declared in 1910, black South Africans who lived in
the Cape Colony possessed an extremely limited right to vote, a
right that was completely eliminated in 1936.12 "The 1909
Constitution of the Union of South Africa [placed] . . . an
omnipotent legislator . . . in the hands of an ethnic or racial
minority,"' 13 thereby compromising the Constitution's ultimate
ability to represent the people at large. "[S]urely rank[ing] as one
of the greatest disasters in the constitutional history of the
world,'"'4 the 1909 Constitution rendered Parliament free to do as
it pleased, and stripped both citizens and the judiciary of the
ability to challenge Parliamentary discretion.15 Compared to its
British counterpart, the power of the South African Parliament was
magnified because it "represented only the white minority"; black
citizens, governed by the executive, had no effective control or
meaningful influence on Parliament initiative. 6 Human rights
violations went unpunished, and the Constitution itself was subject
to capricious Parliamentary amendment.17
When the National Party came to power in 1948, elected by an
all-white electorate, the period of apartheid rule flowed naturally
from the concentration of power in the hands of conservative
Afrikaners. " For the next four decades, any constitutional
protections for the majority black population were widely
disregarded. If not disregarded, many protections were
unenforceable due to a judiciary rendered helpless by its
12 BASSON, supra note 9, at xx.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 3. The 1909 Constitution "was not
supreme" and provided no authority under which the black majority could challenge the
"sovereign Parliament." BASSON, supra note 9, at xx. This model of "parliamentary
sovereignty" originated in Great Britain and is known as the Westminster model. BILL
OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 3; BASSON, supra note 9, at xx. Unlike the
British Parliament, however, the South African Parliament was not politically
accountable to the disenfranchised majority of its population. BILL OF RIGHTS
HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 3.
16 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 3. The judiciary also lacked
significant judicial constraint on Parliament. Id. Courts "could only declare a
[parliamentary] Act invalid if it had not been passed in accordance with the procedures
for passing legislation that had been laid down in the Constitution." Id.
17 Id. at 3-4.
18 BASSON, supra note 9, at xx.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
inadequate constitutional position "as well as a general
unwillingness to assist the subjects of the state against
infringements by the executive authorities."19
As apartheid became increasingly entrenched, cataclysmic
events within South Africa ushered in heightened condemnation
from the international community. In particular, following the
Sharpeville incident in 1960 (when almost seventy black African
demonstrators were killed and nearly 200 injured while protesting
pass laws) 2° and the Soweto uprisings in 1976 (when students
protesting in favor of improved education were shot with live
bullets, thus provoking widespread riots targeting the symbols of
apartheid),21 international leaders further isolated South Africa
through drastic economic sanctions.22
The introduction of the 1983 Constitution only added fuel to a
growing and organizing fire of displeasure. The "system of sham
power-sharing between three 'population groups' in terms of
which the whites ... still exercised the power unhindered and the
blacks were completely excluded" 23 in no way triggered
humanitarian improvement for the most disadvantaged South
African citizens, and a state of emergency was declared as of 1986
in response to the escalating degree of violence. 24  The South
African constitutional system, by the mid-1980s, lost any
semblance of legitimacy.25 It was at this breaking point, however,
that the foundation for the interim Constitution began to take form.
Responding to widespread criticism, the white government and
apartheid opponents began to accept the need for compromise and
19 Id.
20 For a brief overview of the Sharpeville incident, see Ambrose Reeves, The
Sharpeville Massacre - A Watershed in South Africa, available at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/misc/shareve.html.
21 For a brief description of the Soweto uprising, see ROGER B. BECK, THE HISTORY
OF SOUTH AFRICA 159-62 (2000).
22 For a brief description of economic sanctions imposed on South Africa, see id. at
175-76, 178; Jeff Walker, Recent Development, Economic Sanctions: United States
Sanctions Against South Africa--Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986), 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 117 (1987) (summarizing the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986).
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an alternate course of progress. Negotiations between adversarial
leaders ensued, and the path was plotted towards the interim
Constitution.26 Secret meetings between an imprisoned Nelson
Mandela and National Party government members, when coupled
with the elimination of a number of apartheid statutes and the
legalization of* black unions, together foreshadowed the most
dramatic pre-Constitution events of early 1990.27 One year into
his presidential term, in February of 1990, new. State President F.
W. de Klerk released Mandela from prison,28 shortly after opening
Parliament by lifting all legal restrictions that had previously
shackled liberation movement activity. 29 As the African National
Congress ("ANC"), the Pan Africanist Congress, and the South
African Communist Party enjoyed new political freedom, the
ANC and the government began working toward overcoming
some of the most tangible obstacles to productive negotiations-
the armed struggle and the detainment of political prisoners.3"
Officially representing the beginning of the all-party
negotiations, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
("CODESA") convened on December 20, 1991.31 As described by
the Constitutional Court in a 1996 judgment,3 2 "'[a]n interim
government, established and functioning under an interim
constitution agreed to by the negotiating parties, would govern the
country on a coalition basis while a final constitution was being
drafted."' 33 Negotiations at CODESA, however, broke down.3 4
26 See generally HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-
MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998) (containing a historical discussion of the constitutional
negotiations between Dr. Nelson Mandela and the Nationalist Party).
27 BASSON, supra note 9, at xxi.
28 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.
29 See Constitutional Court of South Africa, The Constitution: The History of the
Constitution, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/history.htm (last
visited Jan. 25, 2008). The African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, and
the South African Communist Party were all granted free political movement. BILL OF
RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.
30 See BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.
31 Id. at 5; see also BASSO'N, supra note 9, at xxi (describing the initiation of
CODESA, the obstacles standing in the way of successful negotiation, and the drafting
of the interim Constitution).
32 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Aft.).
33 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting Ex Parte Chairperson of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Following two years of continued discussions between the
ANC and the government,35 formal negotiations were re-initiated
as part of the Multi-Party Negotiation Process ("MPNP").36 On
November 18, 1993, the MPNP ratified the interim Constitution
and declared "a set of binding Constitutional Principles. 37
The interim Constitution was transitional in nature,
establishing the procedures for drafting a "new" and "final"
constitution. Its specific mandates, effective as of April 27, 1994,
were repealed following the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.3"
The detailed obstacles, challenges, and points of contention that
arose during the negotiation process and contributed in shaping the
text of the interim Constitution are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
The brief historical account above underscores the truly
innovative and revolutionary character of the new constitutional
text. For purposes of this piece, the interim Constitution most
notably represented a drastic departure from a system of
"parliamentary sovereignty" in favor of a "doctrine of
constitutional supremacy. 39 Whereas human rights violations had
been largely ignored by the judiciary during the previous century,
Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution declared a Bill of Rights and
granted the courts fresh and relatively unhindered oversight
authority (save a few qualitative interpretive guidelines) in
safeguarding these individual rights for all South African
citizens. 40  The Constitution, now seen as a potential pillar of
security for the historically downtrodden majority, assumed a new
role in the South African social order.
the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA at 779, para. 13).
34 For a general discussion as to why the CODESA negotiations failed, see
Constitutional Court of South Africa, The Constitution: The History of the Constitution,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/history.htm (last visited Jan.
25, 2008).
35 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5.
36 Id.
37 Id. For a complete list of the Constitutional Principles, see ROB AMATO,
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CONSTITUTION 156 (1994).
38 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5.
39 Id. at 2.
40 Id.
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The Bill of Rights, as formulated in Chapter 3 of the interim
Constitution, protected individual rights and freedoms against
abusive state intrusion.4 From the most utopian perspective, the
"introduction of the Bill of Rights... [represented] a radical break
with the constitutional past in terms of which [the] very values of
democracy, dignity, equality and freedom were trampled and
denied, especially by an omnipotent legislature."42
Liberation Movement members envisioned a working bill of
rights long before its official adoption in 1993. Dating back to
1942, the ANC had drafted a charter of rights for South African
people.43 The Freedom Charter of 1955 expanded on the basic
rights and expectations ANC members demanded for an improved,
equal, and democratic society.44  Though in exile, the
Constitutional Committee of the ANC set out to draft its own set
of constitutional principles, with the hope that these declarations
would someday be woven into a new Constitutional Bill of Rights
for all of South Africa. 5
Just as the exiled ANC members formulated a draft Bill of
Rights, so too did the South African Government, which
established the Law Commission to consider the viability of such a
document.46  The Government made two important findings: (1)
attempting to enforce a Bill of Rights before a new Constitution
was adopted, and political equality guaranteed, was impracticable
in theory; and (2) a Bill of Rights "was inconsistent with the
notion of group rights as then projected by the National Party
Government. 47 As such, the Government recognized the need for
41 BASSON, supra note 9, at xxvii.
42 Id.
43 Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa, in THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 8, at 23, 25.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 27. The determination to craft a justiciable Bill of Rights was not
unquestioned. Id. The ANC encountered resistance from some scholars and ANC
affiliated advocates that a Bill of Rights would essentially play itself out to be nothing
more than a "bill of whites." Id. The ANC proceeded to draft constitutional principles,
having researched and understood the important role a Bill of Rights would serve in the
pursuit of freedom, though conscious of the necessary attention towards implementing
and enforcing the text. Id. at 27-29.
46 Id. at 29.
47 Id.
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a "non-racial Constitution" and the ANC (and other liberal
movement participants) began the arduous task of working with
the National Party in search of a workable draft Bill.4"
The ANC and the Government, as expected, nowhere near
approached universal agreement. On a broad level, the Law
Commission and the ANC specifically differed with respect to
who the Bill of Rights addressed and how its true utility would
eventually be determined. In essence, the ANC argued that the
Law Commission's Bill of Rights was structured in overly
technical terms (written with judges and lawyers in mind). The
ANC, on the other hand, envisioned a Bill of Rights with greater
"inner resonance," a document that represented the social and
cultural expectations of the masses, priorities that the individual
would never compromise, nor be asked to compromise.49 From
the ANC's perspective, the injustices stemming from the apartheid
system were best addressed through socioeconomic protections
written into a "'progressive' Bill of Rights."5 The ANC wanted
all rights declared equally fundamental, justiciable, and applicable
as between not only the state and its citizens, but vis-A-vis citizens
themselves. 1
The main purpose of the negotiations leading up to the
adoption of the interim Constitution was to "ensure the ultimate
goal of a liberated and democratic South Africa. 5 2 The interim
Constitution was only a first step towards this goal. The drafters
envisioned a Constituent Assembly comprised of democratically
elected representatives that would write and adopt a final, sturdy,
and legitimate Constitution.53 Despite its deficiencies, the interim
Constitution warrants applause for creating expansive
constitutional jurisdiction in the courts, thereby removing
Parliament from its supreme and unquestioned discretionary
48 Id. at 30.
49 Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa, in THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 8, at 23, 30.
50 PER STRAND, DECISIONS ON DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION-
MAKING 1N SOUTH AFRICA 1990-1996 214-15 (2000).
51 Id. at 215.
52 BASSON, supra note 9, at xxii.
53 Id.
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post.5
4
Creation of a justiciable Bill of Rights stands as "the most
important characteristic of the interim Constitution" and its
greatest accomplishment.5 Though imperfect, this Chapter 3 of
the interim Constitution provided a starting point for securing the
fundamental rights of South African citizens. Neither the swift
and complete passage of power from the state to the individual,
nor the establishment of a firm right of self-determination were
realistic developments at the time. It is therefore important to
reiterate the goals of the interim Constitution, which, though both
practically and theoretically restrained (and done so consciously),
were achieved with great success. Under these guiding objectives,
Mr. Justice Dion Basson, a High Court judge and co-writer of the
new Constitution, asserted in 1995 that the Interim Constitution
not only served its most general purpose, but was also quite
successful in changing the course of South African
constitutionalism:
Taking into account the important features of the interim
Constitution, that is, a supreme, inflexible Constitution, a
justiciable Bill of Rights, a democratic representative
government and commissions and functionaries which enhance a
human rights culture and secure accountability, it would appear
that the interim Constitution was successful in realizing the
aspirations of the people of South Africa and, in essence, creates
an open and democratic society. The era of oppression and
exploitation has ended. The era of constitutionalism and justice
has begun.56
The new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as
signed by President Nelson Mandela on December 10th, 1996,"7
was born in the shadow of the interim Constitution. But, unlike its
predecessor, the 1996 Constitution was adopted by a
democratically elected Constitutional Assembly58  and later
54 Id. at xxiv.
55 Id. at xxvii.
56 BASSON, supra note 9, at xxx.
57 STRAND, supra note 50, at 239. The Constitution was adopted by the
Constitutional Assembly on May 8, 1996. BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at
6.
58 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 6.
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certified by the Constitutional Court59 as being consistent with the
thirty-four Constitutional Principles6" outlined during the
negotiation process.
The Bill of Rights, as contained in Chapter 3 of the interim
Constitution, "enshrined[d] and entrenche[d] the fundamental
human rights and freedoms of the subjects in the state which are
protected against infringement."61  The Bill of Rights were
justiciable promises and obligations assumed by the state,
reviewable by the Constitutional Court and enforced by judicial
order.62 In the 1996 Constitution, as finally adopted, the Bill of
Rights finds its permanent home in Chapter 2 and stands as "one
of the most progressive [Constitutional Bills of Rights] in the
world.,6 3  George Devenish, in his piece entitled "Democratic
Counter Majoritarianism: Protecting Ethnic Minorities in a Liberal
Democracy with Special Reference to South Africa,, 64 argued
demonstratively that "[t]he constitution must contain an
entrenched and justiciable bill of rights that must protect civil and
political rights, i.e. the first generation rights. It must also contain
provisions relating to the second generation rights, i.e. socio-
59 The Constitutional Court initially declined certification of the Constitutional text
as produced on May 8, 1996. See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA
744 at 911, paras. 482-484 (S. Afr.). The Constitutional Assembly resubmitted the text
for consideration, and the Constitutional Court approved the amended version on
October 11, 1996. See BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 6. For the second
Constitutional Court ruling, see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In
re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) at 162, para. 205 (S. Afr.).
60 "The [thirty-four] Constitutional Principles were a framework for the creation of
a democratic state with a supreme constitution in which the fundamental rights and
freedoms of all citizens [were] protected." BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at
7. As certified by the Constitutional Court in October, 1996, the new Constitution
replaced the thirty-four guiding constitutional principles as the legal and social
declarations with which state action must comply. See id.
61 BASSON, supra note 9, at 13.
62 Id.
63 John Cantius Mubangizi, The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic
Rights in Selected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 2 (2006).
64 George Devenish, Democratic Counter Majoritarianism: Protecting Ethnic
Minorities in a Liberal Democracy with Special Reference to South Africa, in THE
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 8, at 37, 37.
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economic rights, and the third generation rights, i.e. environmental
rights. 6 5 The South African Bill of Rights responded to this call-
to-action.66
Though Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution textually resembles
Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution in many ways, the Section 27
protections, paramount to the allegations espoused by Phiri
residents in the case presently pending before the High Court,
were not initially contained in Chapter 3 of the interim version.
With this in mind, the relevant provisions of Chapter 2 of the 1996
Constitution, as cited by the five applicants in the Phiri water
rights case, warrant specific consideration. But before turning to
the specific Constitutional text, a better understanding of the Phiri
water rights case is required.
III. The Phiri Water Rights Case
Phiri is a township in Soweto, bordered by Mapetla and
Moraka, and established during the apartheid era in the late 1950's
"as an ethnic enclave for people designated as Sothos and Tswanas
by the apartheid" regime.67 In its early development, tens of
thousands of low cost homes were constructed, though most
lacked indoor plumping or working toilets.68 Throughout the latter
course of the 20th century, Phiri homes were gradually electrified,
but a housing shortage swept the township by the 1990s, resulting
in some two thousand backyard dwellings being built by the new
millennium.69 Phiri, even by Soweto standards, is notoriously
overcrowded,7 ° boasting a population density of over 180 persons
65 Id. at 38.
66 See Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 2-3. The South African Bill of Rights
"contains all categories of human rights that are ordinarily included in most international
human rights instruments, namely, the so-called first generation rights (which consist of
the traditional civil and political rights) and the rather controversial second and third
generation rights (which consist of social, economic, and cultural rights). For [this]
reason, many commentators see South Africa as a benchmark in terms of the
constitutional protection and judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights." Id.
67 COALITION AGAINST WATER PRIVATISATION ET AL., THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
SILENT DISCONNECTIONS: PREPAID METERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE IN PHIRI,
SOWETO 11 (2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Phiri.pdf [hereinafter THE
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per hectare.7 Of specific note for the purposes of this piece,
Soweto households only rarely have a separate bathroom, and
there is generally an elevated degree of water loss both through
outside taps and outdated standpipes."
In July of 2006, five Phiri residents filed papers in the
Witwatersrand High Court "asking that the government's capped
free water allowance as well as prepaid meters be declared
unconstitutional."" The five applicants listed the City of
Johannesburg, the Johannesburg Water LTD, and the Minister of
Water Affairs and Forestry as named respondents.74 The Phiri
residents challenged a handful of decisions made by the City of
Johannesburg to effectively limit the free basic water supply to six
kiloliters per household per month, as well as discontinue an un-
metered scheme of water distribution in favor of a controlled
volume water supply system operated through pre-paid meters.75
Beyond declaring these practices unconstitutional, the Phiri
residents, all unemployed and impoverished,76 seek "a free basic
water supply of 50 litres per person per day[] and the option of a
metered supply installed at the cost of the City of Johannesburg. 77
A brief historical summary of the important developments in water
policy that preceded this court action will help make sense of the
allegations.
A. South African Water Policy: A Brief Review
When the ANC party assumed power in 1994, it did so "under
contract" with the electorate responsible for its rise to political
triumph. 78  A pillar of the ANC's commitment to the majority
71 Id. One hectare is the equivalent often thousand square meters.
72 Id. at 10-11.
73 Yolandi Groenewald, Soweto Starts its Water war, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE,
July 24, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=278512&area=/
insight/insightnational!.
74 Applicants' Notice of Mot., available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/
index.htm (follow "Notice of Motion" hyperlink). The Notice of Motion was filed in the
High Court of South Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division. Id.
75 Id. 3-4.
76 Centre for Applied Legal Studies, supra note 6, at 1.
77 Applicants' Notice of Mot., supra note 74, 1 8.
78 Dale McKinley, Water is Life: The Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Struggle
Against Water Privatisation 1, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000584/
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black and poor South African constituency, the Reconstruction
and Development Programme ("RDP")79  was seen as a
redistributive promise premised on a quest for substantial
socioeconomic liberty and justice.
As outlined in the RDP, water was one of the fundamental
municipal resources to be redistributed to redress historical
injustice exercised against the poor and black citizenry."s
Improved access to sufficient, sanitary water was thus both
promised and expected. However, prior to 1995, the ANC had
seemingly forgotten its oath to the people, bowing to the greater
forces of the international purse and prioritizing privatized
investment over grass-root commitments.
The South African government adopted a policy inconsistent
with the RDP's pledge to a lifeline supply of water and, by 1996,
under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank, created the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR).8 GEAR represented a neo-
liberal, macro-economic scheme, setting the stage for a gradual
privatization of the South African water supply. 82  "GEAR
espouse[d] an official government policy of free markets and
globalization, including the opening of domestic markets to
foreign competition, privatization of state-owned industries, and
restrictions on public spending.,
83
GEAR thrust water delivery responsibility firmly on the
shoulders of local municipalities,84  while the government
simultaneously decreased its social spending and financial support
for city council operations.85 Pinched on both sides, and running
P531_McKinley.pdf (last visited January 23, 2008). Professor McKinley is a leading
activist with the Anti-Privatisation Forum.
79 See Reconstruction & Dev. Programme, A Policy Framework 1.1,
http://www.anc.org.za/rdp/rdpall.html (follow "What is the RDP" hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 26, 2008).
80 Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy at the
Intersection of Human Rights, Economics and Political Power, 18 GEO. INT'L EVNTL. L.
REV. 149, 156 (2005).
81 See McKinley, supra note 78, at 2.
82 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
83 Francis, supra note 80, at 157.
84 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
85 McKinley, supra note 78, at 2.
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out of internal resources, municipalities turned to the private sector
to replace lost revenue. As a result, "water delivery in South
Africa has become the responsibility of an international private
sector in the form of the major transnational companies that
control the provision of water all over the world. 8 6
Consequentially, the price of water skyrocketed, the repercussions
of which were most dearly felt by the poor and uninformed.87
In accordance with World Bank initiative, Johannesburg and
other city councils instituted cost recovery88 policies against
residents faced with insurmountable water bills.89 Residents who
failed to pay their utility bill had service discontinued. As a result,
widespread cut-offs were implemented throughout the poorest
South African communities.9" Following the terminations of
utility service, evictions rose, displeasure mounted, and resistance
organized. 91 As the anti-privatization voice grew louder, corporate
leaders began to consider alternative ways to maximize revenue,
minimize water waste, and realize their neo-liberal objectives.92
The prepaid meter became a potentially viable option.
Since 2001, Johannesburg Water has been jointly operated by
the French multinational Suez Lyonnaise and British
Northumbrian Water.93 The City of Johannesburg also entered
86 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
87 Dale T. McKinley, The Struggle Against Water Privatisation in South Africa, in
RECLAIMING PUBLIC WATER 181, 182-84 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Struggle Against
Water Privatisation].
88 For a brief definition of cost recovery policies, with specific reference to South
African utilities, see THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at
4 n..3; see also Francis, supra note 80, at 157 (providing an overview of cost recovery
policy in municipal service delivery).
89 See Struggle Against Water Privatisation, supra note 87, at 182-84.
90 See THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
91 "For the past three years Phiri has been a hotbed of activism in what residents
call their battle for water. Dissidents have been detained and others injured during
confrontations with the police over imposed household pre-paid water meters."
Groenewald, supra note 73.
92 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 4-5.
93 PUBLIC CITIZEN, SUEZ: A CORPORATE PROFILE 5, 11-12 (2005),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/profilesuez.pdf, see also Press Release, Suez,
Lyonnaise des Eaux Signs the Water Management Contract of Johannesburg (Feb. 14,
2001), http://www.suez.com/en/presse/press/releases-archives/archives/ (follow
"14/02/2001 - Lyonnaise des Eaux Signs the Water Management Contract of
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into contracts with Rand Water, a parastatal water utility that
provides water to Johannesburg Water.94 For these private
companies, the prepaid meter system serves valuable functions.
Through a front-end payment scheme, water is distributed only to
paying customers, thus avoiding cumbersome debt collection,
while presumably (from the state's perspective) promoting sound
and efficient water use.95 For impoverished South Africans,
however, the individual right to safe and sufficient water, as
promised by the Constitution, has become contingent upon an
individual's financial security and capacity to pay.96
Through its search for a sustainable "cost recovery" scheme,
Johannesburg Water introduced prepaid meters in scores across
some of South Africa's poorest townships.97 Phiri, well known for
inefficient water use and water connections illegally secured by its
residents to avoid regulation compliance,98 was among the targeted
regions. Amos Masondo, Johannesburg's mayor, implemented
Operation Gcin'amanzi (Operation Save Water)99 in September
2003, spurring the construction of Soweto's prepaid meter
stands.'00 The logistics of Operation Gcin'amanzi provide the
framework for the Phiri residents' constitutional challenge.
"The objective of Operation Gcin'amanzi is to create an
efficient water supply system and achieve significant savings in
Johannesburg" hyperlink)
94 For a company profile of Rand Water, see Rand Water South Africa,
http://www.randwater.co.za (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
95 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 3-5. Note
that the "use of prepaid water in the United Kingdom was declared illegal in 1998."
Groenewald, supra note 73.
96 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 5.
97 Id. at 7.
98 Id.
99 Soweto, South Africa, WATERGY CASE STUDY (Alliance to Save Energy,
Washington, D.C.), at 1-2, http://www.watergy.net/resources/casestudies/
sowetosouthafrica.pdf [hereinafter Alliance to Save Energy]; see also Groenewald,
supra note 73 (describing Operation Gcin'amanzi as a "multimillion-rand initiative to
upgrade the water supply facilities in Soweto"). Project Gcin'amanzi was instituted to
combat water losses in Soweto which, by 2003, amounted to seven billion liters a month.
Anna Cox, STAR (South Africa), Court Battle Looms About Basic Water Supply, July 17,
2006, at 8, available at http://www.int.iol.co.za/ (search "Article Search" for "court
battle looms"; then follow "Court battle looms over basic water supply" hyperlink).
100 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 7.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
total water supplied to the area by reducing excessive consumption
and wastage."'' As promoted by the government and its
supporters, Operation Gcin'amanzi allows residents to claim
ownership of their water consumption while simultaneously
realizing the government's primary goal of reducing the financial
costs associated with water waste.'12 From a poor resident's
perspective, efficient cost recovery only further restricts what is
already inadequate access to sanitary water. 10 3  The Phiri
community physically and verbally resisted the prepaid meter
initiative, yet the groundwork for its implementation went largely
unimpeded. '04
Specifically addressed in the papers filed with the High Court,
Operation Gcin'amanzi allows each property to secure its first six
thousand liters, per month, free of charge." 5  Beyond this
threshold volume, citizens are forced to pay consistent with their
consumption. Once six thousand liters have been depleted, water
use inevitably becomes contingent on disposable financial
resources.
In the nearly three and a half years since the launch of
Operation Gcin'amanzi, citizen experience has varied. Whereas
some Phiri residents have comfortably adjusted to the six thousand
free liter policy,0 6 others have had their water cut off when they
used excess water beyond the free allocation and could not afford
the surplus.0 7 Many have reluctantly accepted the prepaid system
in order to avoid complete disconnection.0 8 The prepaid system,
however, has provided nothing short of a brief respite from water
101 Alliance to Save Energy, supra note 99, at 1; see also THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 8.
102 Alliance to Save Energy, supra note 99, at 1-2.
103 McKinley, supra note 78, at 3-5.
104 Id. at 5-7; see also THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at 7
(describing the physical altercations involving protestors and Johannesburg Water's
security employees).
105 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS, supra note 67, at7.
106 Lucky Sindane, Joburg Water Saves Billions, JOHANNESBURG NEWS AGENCY,
August 11, 2005, http://www.joburgnews.co.za/articles/archiveservices.stm (follow
"Joburg Water Saves Billions" hyperlink).
107 Centre for Applied Legal Studies, supra note 6, at 1.
108 Id. Prior to the implementation of the prepaid system, "[a]ll of the residents had
... been supplied with unlimited water for which a flat-rate was levied." Id.
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shortage concerns as many financially-strapped residents go
without water for large chunks of a given month once their allotted
free water is consumed.10 9
Typical of a socially divisive government policy, Operation
Gcin'amanzi's ultimate success (or failure) is framed in
contrasting terms. Whereas government supporters highlight the
millions of Rand saved by the dramatic decrease in dispensed
water,"l0  grass-root opponents underscore the troubling
humanitarian implications restricted water allocation contingent on
household income necessarily provokes.
Against this backdrop, the Phiri residents have now voiced
their dissent in the courtroom, anxious to secure a judicial decision
condemning this allegedly unconstitutional privatization program.
Whether described as a right or a privilege, access to sufficient
water has constitutional ramifications, thanks to a socioeconomic
promise codified in. the South African Bill of Rights.'"
B. The Phiri Applicants: Their Stories and Legal Claims
The five unemployed Phiri residents capture the consequences
of the prepaid water scheme in a variety of ways. Considered
together, the five applicants demonstrate a bleak reality which
reflects the community's larger plight. In the broadest of terms,
the Phiri applicants challenge two related decisions made by the
City of Johannesburg with respect to water policy: the decision to
limit the free basic water supply to six kiloliters and the decision
to discontinue the "uncontrolled volume water supply," previously
administered at a fixed charge, in favor of the prepaid program
described above." 2 Additional objections focus on the manner in
which prepaid meters were forced upon resisting residents, the
dearth of alternative options presented, and the National Standards
Regulation used in determining the six kiloliter monthly
109 Groenewald, supra note 73.
110 Alliance to Save Energy, supra note 99, at 2. See generally Sindane, supra note
106 (describing, from the City's perspective, the efficient, -cost-effective policy
implemented through Operation Gcin'amanzi).
111 See infra note 137 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Section
27(1) of the Constitution.
112 Applicants' Notice of Mot., supra note 74, 1.
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distribution per household. 13 The applicants seek a "free basic
water supply of 50 litres per person per day... and the option of a
metered supply installed at the cost of the City of
Johannesburg."" 
4
In her founding affidavit, Lindiwe Mazibuko, the first of the
five applicants, expands on the above declarations and describes
the demographic characteristics of her fellow Phiri residents
before the court. Ms. Mazibuko goes on to describe the legal basis
for the claims, citing among others: the RDP's1 5 promise to
provide a free basic water supply of 25 liters per person per day as
declared in the mid-1990's;" 6 the subsequent assurance to the
same end as embodied in central documents of water reform and
policy known as the White Papers;" 7  and the relevant
constitutional provisions" 8  central to this comment. Ms.
Mazibuko also identifies unsatisfied legal obligations stemming
from the following statutes: the Water Services Act ("WSA")," 9
the National Water Act ("NWA"), 120  the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act ("PAJA"), 12' and the National
Standards Regulations. 2
Lindiwe Mazibuko is the thirty-nine year old daughter of Anna
Mazibuko, and one of twenty family members or boarders living
''3 Id. 3-4,6-7.
114 Id. 8.
115 See generally Reconstruction & Dev. Programme, supra note 79 (describing the
RDP).
116 "The RDP's short-term aim is to provide every person with adequate facilities
for health. The RDP will achieve this by establishing a national water and sanitation
programme which aims to provide all households with a clean, safe water supply of 20-
30 litres per capita per day (lcd) within 200 metres, an adequate/safe sanitation facility
per site, and a refuse removal system to all urban households." Id. 2.6.6.
117 DEP'T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION POLICY
WHITE PAPER 14-16 (1994), http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/WSSP.pdf;
DEP'T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL WATER POLICY
FOR SOUTH AFRICA passim (1997), http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/
nwpwp.pdf.
118 See discussion infra Section "Interpreting the 1996 Constitutional Text:
Implications for Phiri Residents."
119 Water Services Act 108 of 1997.
120 National Water Act 36 of 1998.
121 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
122 Government Notice (GN) R509/2001.
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on her mother's property. 123  Though retired, Anna is the only
source of monetary support, and as such is independently
responsible for healthcare costs, utility obligations, and the day-to-
day sustenance of the household. 124  Facing an insurmountable
water debt, the Mazibuko household's water supply was
disconnected'25 and the construction of prepayment meters began.
Lindiwe claims that cut-offs permeated throughout Phiri, and
prepaid meters were installed either unbeknownst to Phiri
residents, against their will, or presented as the only available
alternative to disconnection. 126 After enduring a twelve kilometer
daily trip to an available water source for as long as possible, the
Mazibuko household grudgingly applied for a prepaid meter in
early October of 2004.127
Ms. Mazibuko's complaint principally focuses on the free six
kiloliter allocation and the practical shortcomings for a household
her size. The Mazibuko household usually consumes its six free
kiloliters within the first two weeks of each month'28 and, lacking
disposable income, typically endures the duration of the month on
inadequate water costing them an average of fifty Rand. 129 Were
the Mazibuko household to stringently follow the guidelines
promoted by Johannesburg Water, it would lack sufficient water to
satisfy even the most basic needs of household members.'30
Other applicants detail the adverse ramifications that sparse
water rights have on caring for HIV-infected family members,'
123 "The household" consists of one house and two shacks. Mazibuko Founding
Aff. T 68, available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/index.htm (follow "Lindiwe
Mazibuko (Founding Affidavit)" hyperlink).





129 Mazibuko Founding Aff. TT 101-104, available at
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/index.htm (follow "Lindiwe Mazibuko (Founding
Affidavit)" hyperlink). The total monthly household income was listed at 300 rand per
month. Id. 7 73.
130 Id. 7 114. For instance, each person would be allotted one flush of the toilet
every two days and one "body wash" every four days. Id.
131 See Munyai Aff. 7 13-17, available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/
index.htm (follow "Grace Munyai" hyperlink) (describing the water needs of HIV-
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ensuring safety from fires,'32 and hosting family rituals.'33 The
applicants contend that in arriving at the six kiloliter
determination, the government failed to adequately account for the
typically larger Phiri household'34 and the basic water needs of
each individual in such circumstances.
35
On behalf of the four other applicants, and the Phiri
community at large, Ms. Mazibuko's complaint challenges the
discontinuance of the flat-rate water supply, the installation of
prepayment meters, and the limitation of free water to six kiloliters
per household per month. These umbrella objections find
credibility in the South African Constitution, and provide an
opportunity to consider the human and legal right to water, the
depth of the post-apartheid socioeconomic reorganization, and a
progressive and evolving constitutional and litigious framework
within which the High Court will operate. Before turning to the
specific legislative acts in question, the relevant Bill of Rights
provisions merit introduction and discussion.
IV. Interpreting the 1996 Constitutional Text: Implications for
Phiri Residents
Very few nations have firmly recognized second-generation
rights (which include social and economic rights like the right to
water, education, and housing) 3 6 in their Constitutions. South
Africa is among the select few, making its Constitution one of the
most progressive in the world. The constitutional provisions
infected Phiri residents).
132 See Paki Aff. 7-13, available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/
index.htm (follow "Vusimuzi Paki" hyperlink) (recounting a fire that engulfed the
household, and the low water pressure that prevented effectively containing the flames).
133 See Groenewald, supra note 73. Jennifer Makoatsane describes how inadequate
water disrupted her father's funeral. Id.
134 See Mazibuko Founding Aff., supra note 123, 121. "[I]t appears that the
Government assumes that there are no more than 8 members in a household in South
Africa. This is certainly not the case in Phiri, where each 'household', including
backyard shacks dependant on the supply of water to the main house, is 16 people." Id.
135 See Mazibuko Supplementary Aff. 17, available at
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/phiri/index.htm (follow "Supplementary Founding
Affidavit" hyperlink) (discussing the special circumstances confronting the Phiri
Community).
136 See Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 2-3; supra text accompanying note 66.
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described below, and the state obligations they create, either have
been specifically named in filed court documents or potentially
support the Phiri applicants' claims. This section focuses on some
interpretive techniques that might best illuminate the downstream
implications of the Bill of Rights for Phiri residents.
A. Section 27
The Phiri applicants premise their claim, first and foremost,
upon the seemingly basic declaration of Section 27. That clause,
titled "Health Care, Food, Water, and Social Security," reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social
assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 37
Section 27(1)(b) firmly acknowledges the right to food and
water for all South African citizens. The existence of a right to
food or adequate nutrition is not a novel idea. Such a right is
recognized by a handful of "international human rights
instruments.' 38 As written, the Section 27 rights are not direct.
That is to say that people have the right to realize access to
"sufficient food and water,' ' 139 but these rights are conditioned
upon the resources available to the state department providing the
service. 4 ° The degree of "sufficiency" required also remains
137 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27.
138 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARY AND CASES 355
(Dennis Davis, Halton Cheadle & Nicholas Haysom eds., 1997) [hereinafter
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS]. Included among the "international human rights instruments"
that have recognized the right to food are the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (article 11) and Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(article 25). Id.
139 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(1).
140 MANDLA SELEOANE, SocIo-ECONOMIc RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION: THEORY AND Practice 41-42 (2001); see also BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
uncertain and will be determined by the High Court.
Even though the right to water enjoys support in several
international agreements, it has not been independently identified
as a human right by as many international agreements as the right
to adequate nutrition and food."' That said, a forged division in
assessing the sufficient food and water access available to South
African citizens, even if textually supported, in practice makes
little sense. "Water is a vital component of nutrition so that
without water the right to food is meaningless." '142
In the founding affidavit filed by Lindiwe Mazibuko,"' the
five Phiri applicants ground their legal claims in the Constitutional
obligations set forth in Section 27.1" Consistent with the
guidelines laid out in the Constitution's Preamble, Section 27 not
only acknowledges those qualities that comprise an adequate
standard of living, but also solidifies protection for basic
necessities central to a healthy everyday existence. 145 The South
African Constitution demands that all citizens, including the Phiri
applicants, have access to sufficient water.
Section 27 is the most overt source of Constitutional protection
available to the Phiri residents, but it does not stand alone. The
more subtle Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) provisions considered
below in many ways compliment the Section 27 state
commitments. These Sections of Chapter 2 provide additional
support for the water rights claims of the Phiri applicants.
B. Section 7
By virtue of Section 7(1), the Bill of Rights "enshrines the
rights of all people in [South Africa] and affirms the democratic
values of human dignity, equality and freedom., 146 Section 7(2) 141
supra note 3, at 591 ("[T]he right may not be directly infringed by retrogressive
measures, while reasonable legislative and implementation measures to achieve
progressive realisation of the right are required.").
141 See FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 355-56.
142 Id. at 355.
143 Mazibuko Founding Aff., supra note 123.
144 Id. 25-26.
145 Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 5.
146 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 7(1).
147 Lindiwe Mazibuko also cited Section 7(2) in her supplementary affidavit filed
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obligates the state to "respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the
rights in the Bill of Rights," 14 8 and when read in accordance with
the "guiding principles"' 4 9 set forth in 7(1), "appears to impose
certain duties upon the state."' 15' Thus, state interference with
these rights is not merely restricted, but rather the state must adopt
affirmative measures to ensure the realization of the Bill of
Rights. 5' These positive state "duties," such as the provision of
sufficient water, have, as alleged, been inadequately fulfilled.
Judicial enforcement, the primary mechanism through which
"enjoyment of socio-economic rights takes place,"'5 is the chosen
path to enjoyment, if not the only option, of the Phiri applicants.
C. Section 8
Section 8 concerns the application of the Bill of Rights.
Unquestionably, the Bill of Rights, upon its adoption a decade
ago, became binding on the South African government.'53 Unlike
the interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution addressed, in
Section 8, concerns that the Bill of Rights would not reach the
discriminatory behavior of private individuals or bodies. Section
8(2) and 8(3) extend the application of the Bill of Rights
horizontally, i.e. as "between one citizen or private body and
another."154
Under the interim Constitution, and according to the 1996
Constitutional Court decision in Du Plessis v. De Klerk,'55 the Bill
with the High Court. Mazibuko Supplementary Aff., supra note 132, 19.2.
148 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 7(2).
149 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 27.
150 Id.
151 See Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 5-6. "The state may do this in several ways:
through the legislature by enacting the relevant enabling legislation; and through the
executive and state administration by adopting the necessary policies and making the
appropriate administrative decisions." Id. at 6.
152 Id. at 6.
153 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 8(l). For the analogous provision in the
interim Constitution, see S. AFr. (Interim) CONST. ch. 3, § 7(1).
154 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Your Rights: The Bill of Rights,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/yourrights/thebillofrights.htm (follow
"Vertical and horizontal application" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
155 Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk & Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.)..
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
of Rights did not apply to horizontal disputes. 56 Disputes among
private parties were resolved using common law principles.157 A
textual amendment executed in Section 8 of the 1996 Constitution
changed the status quo.158 By including the term "judiciary,"
Section 8(1) directly thrust constitutional obligations upon the
judiciary in reviewing private, horizontal disputes.159 Thus, the
Bill of Rights gained new life. The depth of the horizontal
application, however, is unknown, and will partially reveal itself
through constitutional litigation, such as that before the High
Court. 160
Section 8(1), by extending application of the Bill of Rights
beyond the legislative and executive branches of government to
the judiciary, "supports the conclusion that [C]hapter 2 applies to
all law in all its applications, namely to governmental action as
well as to acts of private individuals. ' 161 As discussed later, the
water policies implemented to the detriment of so many Phiri
residents are initiated through complex cooperation between
private corporations and a municipal government. The definition
of "organs of state" indicates that those institutions subject to
constitutional scrutiny need not be identified as statutory bodies.
162
In other words, the degree of the public power exerted by the
institution in question is one of many factors considered in
156 Id. at 889, para. 67.
157 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 33.
158 "The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary, and all organs of state." S. AR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 8(1) (emphasis added).
The interim Constitution, by comparison, stated as follows: "[t]his Chapter shall bind all
legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of government." S. AR. (Interim)
CONST. ch. 3, § 7(1).
159 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 34.
160 For a discussion regarding competing notions of horizontal application, see
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 43.
161 Id. at 44.
162 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 14, § 239. Three categories of conduct point
toward classification as an "organ of state": (1) "[clonduct of any department of state or
administration in the national, provincial or local spheres of government"; (2) "[c]onduct
of any other functionary or institution exercising a power or performing a function in
terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution"; and (3) "[c]onduct of any
functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in
terms of any legislation." BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 47
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determining the constitutional breath of their activity. 163
Respondent Johannesburg Water (PTY) LTD, for instance, most
likely falls under the broad definition of "state organ," subjecting
it to Constitutional obligations like the provision of sufficient
water.
D. Section 9
On a more abstract level, the Section 9 equality protection
provision captures the essence of the Phiri resident action. Section
9, titled "Equality," reads in part as follows:
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights
and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality,
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, . . .
ethnic or social origin, colour, .'.. age, disability, ... culture,
language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection
(3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit
unfair discrimination. 164
Simply put, the water allocation system in place has negatively
impacted black, impoverished residents in a disproportionate and
potentially unconstitutional manner. An equality guarantee along
the lines of Section 9, with fiscal considerations temporarily put
aside, presumably ensures that one citizen will not realize an
entrenched right at the cost of another being denied the same
protection. 165  From a formal perspective, equality demands
''sameness of treatment: the law must treat individuals in like
circumstances alike.' 66
163 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 44.
164 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 9.
165 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 61.
166 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 232.
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Formally speaking, the Johannesburg water policy, as later
discussed in detail, speaks to all South African citizens in the same
tone, whether white or black, wealthy or poor. However, from a
substantive perspective, the "equality of outcome" is compromised
by an approach rooted in formal equality. 167 Because the pursuit
of mere formal equality fails to adequately account for disparities
along social and economic lines-a harsh reality in post-apartheid
South Africa-analyzing state behavior through a substantive lens
allows the reviewing judicial body to better evaluate whether the
"Constitution's commitment to equality is being upheld." 168 Phiri
residents have a strong case structured in terms of disparate
treatment.
The Constitutional Court detailed the analytical progression
for unpacking an equal protection claim in its 1998 decision,
Harksen v. Lane NO.169 After determining whether the law or
conduct differentiates between people or categories, and
considering any rational connection to a legitimate government
purpose, the Court will gauge whether or not the differentiation
"amounts to unfair discrimination."170 During this second inquiry,
the Court will ask the following questions:
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to 'discrimination'? If
it is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been
established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or
not there is discrimination will depend upon whether,
objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics
which have the potential to impair the fundamental human
dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely
in a comparably serious manner.
(ii) If the differentiation amounts to 'discrimination', does it
amount to 'unfair discrimination'? If it has been found to have
been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If
167 Id. at 233. See also Nadine Strossen, Translating a Bill of Rights' Paper
Guarantees into Meaningful Human Rights Protections, in INTERPRETING A BILL OF
RIGHTS 50, 61 (Johan Kruger & Brian Currin eds., 1994) (discussing, prior to passage of
the 1996 Constitution, how best to add meaning to the equality clause).
168 Bill of Rights Handbook, supra note 3, at 233.
169 Harksen v Lane NO & Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at 323-25, paras 51-54 (S.
Afr.).
170 Id. at 324-25, para. 54; Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa &
Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at 10, para. 20 (S. Aft.).
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on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established
by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on
the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others
in his or her situation. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry,
the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no
violation of section 8(2). 171
Finally, "[i]f the discrimination is found to be unfair then a
determination will have to be made as to whether the provision
can be justified under the limitations clause ([§] 33 of the interim
Constitution).' 7 2
Under this approach, the Constitutional Court (and lower
courts like the High Court) will have an opportunity to assess the
implementation of Operation Gcin'amanzi and determine whether
the Phiri allegations encompass a Section 9 violation. Water
policies must reflect relevant water laws, and must do so under the
guise of equal protection.
E. Section 33
Section 33 is the one of the two Constitutional provisions,
alongside Section 27,173 specifically mentioned 174 in the founding
affidavit filed by Lindiwe Mazibuko on behalf of the other four
applicants. 175 Section 33 reads, in full:
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these
rights, and must-
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court
or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in
171 Harksen, 1998 (1) SA at 324-25, para. 54; Satchwell, 2002 (6) SA at 10, para.
20.
172 Harksen, 1998 (1) SA at 325, para. 54; Satchwell, 2002 (6) SA at 10, para. 20.
173 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(1).
174 Mazibuko Founding Aff., supra note 123, 1 26 ("The Constitution also provides
in section 33(1) that every person has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair.").
175 See id. T 2.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
subsections (1) and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.176
Applicant Mazibuko's explicit reference to Section 33
underscores the provision's pivotal role in formulating the
constitutional claims of the Phiri residents. Section 33 was drafted
in direct response to the runaway administrative power of the
apartheid era that largely went unconstrained by an unenthusiastic
judiciary. 177 Irrespective of whether an administrative action is
considered "reasonable," Section 33 encourages the Court to
initiate a balancing inquiry by weighing the "substantive
justification" promoted by the administration in question against
the alleged misconduct. 178  By seeking review from the High
Court, the Phiri residents have proclaimed the administrative
activity 179 of Johannesburg Water LTD, as well as the City of
Johannesburg and the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry,
unconstitutional. 180
F. Section 36
Section 36, the "limitation clause," establishes the boundaries
placed on generally applicable fundamental rights, and the
justifications that warrant intrusion on, or restriction of, the basic
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 181 Section 36 ties in the
language of Section 1 to outline the limits of individual
prerogative. In full, it reads as follows:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors including-
176 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 33.
177 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 642.
178 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 163.
179 See generally BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 645
("[A]dministrative action is conduct of an administrative nature performed by public
authorities and the conduct of private persons and entities when they exercise public
powers or perform public functions.").
180 See id. ("[A]n allegation that a particular exercise of public power is reviewable
amounts to an allegation that it is unconstitutional ... .
181 Id. at 163.
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(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
182
Understanding and testing the limitation clause is properly viewed
as a separate step in the litigation process, distinct from
determining whether or not a right has been infringed by the
respondent. 183  Determining the legitimacy, reasonableness, or
justification for the infringement prompts the court to consider the
impact the conduct or law has on the affected society.184
If the High Court were to side with the Phiri applicants, at least
with respect to the constitutional claims, and declare a Bill of
Rights infringement, the limitation clause would bear its teeth.
The inescapable Section 36 inquiry would test whether the
infringement is reasonable and justifiable. In other words, the
Constitutional Court, upon appeal, presumably would not allow an
entrenched right to be undermined simply because the intrusion
made fiscal sense, or was adopted with the general welfare in
mind.'85  By requiring that the limitation be justifiable, the
Constitution places a heavy burden on the intruding actor to prove
a compellingly important impetus behind the questionable
behavior.186
"Any restriction on a right must be reasonable and must be
proportional in that the impact or extent of the restriction must
match the importance of the aim served by the limitation of the
right."'187  The conduct or law in question must serve a
constitutionally appropriate purpose, and the infringement that
182 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 36.
183 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 166.
184 Id. at 167.
185 Id. at 164.
186 Id.
187 Constitutional Court of South Africa, supra note 154 (follow "The limitation
clause" hyperlink).
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results from its implementation must be proportional to the
benefits it seeks to create.188 In S v. Bhulwana,'89 a 1996 decision,
the Constitutional Court expressly detailed the Section 36 analysis:
In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effects and
importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales
and the nature and effect of the infringement caused by the
legislation on the other. The more substantial the inroad into
fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds ofjustification must be.' 90
The scope of the limitation clause is defined on a case-by-case
basis. The more important the fundamental right being infringed
upon, the more justification the infringers must demonstrate. 9'
Likewise, the purpose compelling the infringement must be central
to the pursuit of constitutional democracy192 and generally
regarded, by reasonable citizens, as abundantly important. 93 The
nature of the infringed-upon right, and the degree of its
contribution towards attaining a "democracy based on human
dignity, equality and freedom," will affect how the limitation
exerted on the right is conceptualized.1 94
As discussed below in greater detail, the causal connection
between the water policies and their benefits may prove unstable,
undermining the requisite close attachment between the law (or
conduct) and its purpose demanded by the standards of
reasonableness and justifiability. 95  Lack of a "rational
connection" between the declared purpose and the underlying
institutional action weighs in favor of a rights infringement being
deemed unjustifiable. 196 The Court will also consider whether the
desired benefit could be achieved through less intrusive means.1 97
The limitation clause inquiry, if reached by the High Court,
188 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 176.
189 S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) (S. Afr.).
190 Id. at 395, para. 18.
191 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 178.
192 Id. at 179.
193 Id. at 180.
194 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 319.
195 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 183.
196 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 319.
197 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 36(e).
[Vol. XXXIII
2008] THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WATER 541
will focus primarily on the financial justification that lurks behind
the potentially unconstitutional water distribution scheme. The
judiciary will determine whether the financial justification is a
compelling enough reason 98 for this infringement upon the
fundamental right to sufficient water. The court's inquiry will
likely focus on the water distribution scheme's proportionality.
G. Section 38
Section 38 addresses standing before the court and, in part,
reads as follows:
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a
competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has
been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons
who may approach a court are-
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;...
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a
group or class of persons; [and]
(d) anyone acting in the public interest ....99
The Phiri applicants appear to have legitimate standing under
Section 38(a) to be heard before the High Court. Section 38
represents a far broader approach to standing than that recognized
under the common law prior to the adoption of the 1996
Constitution.20  Though perhaps largely inconsequential for our
present inquiry, it is important to note that Section 38 has reduced
restrictive standing requirements (though not completely20 1) to
promote the "[e]ffective enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 2 2
H. Section 39
More than any other provision contained in the Bill of Rights,
Section 39, at least analytically, should guide the course of judicial
review. The interpretation clause reads:
198 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 179.
199 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 38.
200 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 80.
201 For a more expansive discussion on the sustained standing limitations under the
new Constitution, see id. at 82-91.
202 Id. at 80.
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(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum-
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum
must promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of
Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other
rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common
law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are
consistent with the Bill.2°3
As described below, extensive social and political commentary
has focused on the evolution of socioeconomic norms recognized
by international bodies and implemented by state governments.
The Constitutional Court has emphasized the role both foreign and
international law play in interpreting the South African Bill of
Rights2 4 and encourages consideration of even those international
human rights agreements to which South Africa is not a
signatory. 25 As a result, how and whether the right to water has
been legally declared in foreign jurisdictions may influence the
High Court's analysis of Operation Gcin'amanzi.2 °6  Similarly,
particularly strong evidence demonstrating an absolute, albeit
theoretical human right to water as recognized in international
circles may provoke a more sympathetic judicial inquiry into the
humanitarian effects of prepaid meters.
203 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 39.
204 See generally S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.) (discussing the
framework created by international agreements, customary law, and tribunal decisions in
which the Bill of Rights can be understood). For an overview of the importance of
foreign and international law in South African constitutional interpretation, see BILL OF
RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 159-61.
205 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 160.
206 See id. at 160 (describing the role comparative human rights jurisprudence can
play during the development of indigenous jurisprudence); see also Groenewald, supra
note 73 (discussing how prepaid meters have been outlawed in United Kingdom).
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As South Africa continues to emerge from the apartheid
shadow, well-publicized decisions, such as this one, will reveal the
Constitution's success on an international stage. It is reasonable to
assume that the impact of the subsequent impression forged by
South African courts with respect to the socioeconomic protection
of the historically oppressed is not beyond the judiciary's
comprehension.
V. South African Legislation: Codifying the Constitutional
Right to Water
"Some, For All, Forever"20 7
As alluded to earlier, a handful of important legislative acts
paved the way for contemporary South African water policy.
Breaking down this national legislation reveals a facially
progressive and human rights-oriented legal regime constructed to
secure improved basic water access for the public.20 8 In practice,
however, improvements in access to water remain largely
unrealized for the poorest South Africans,20 9 Phiri residents among
them. A more comprehensive review of the legislation
summarized below is beyond the scope of this comment, but a
passing understanding of these important provisions helps
illustrate the water guidelines in effect today.
Water was a critical component of the post-apartheid strategy
aimed at achieving social and environmental retribution.210  The
Water Services Act and the National Water Act, cumulatively,
identified three principal objectives: (1) to "redress the inequalities
and racial and gender discrimination of the past;" (2) to "link
207 "Some, for all, forever" is a somewhat ironic part of the policy framework of the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. H. M. MACKAY, INST. FOR WATER QUALITY
STUDIES, DEP'T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, TOWARD A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR WATER RESOURCES IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998),
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/DirIWQS/waterlaw/class/wisa.html. Perhaps "some, for all..
who can pay, forever" would be more appropriate.
208 See Francis, supra note 80, at 161.
209 Id.
210 Barbara Schreiner, Barbara van Koppen, & Tshep Khumabne, From Bucket to
Basin: A New Paradigm for Water Management, Poverty Eradication and Gender
Equity, in HYDROPOLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A SOUTHERN AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE 127, 127 (Anthony Turton & Roland Henwood eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Bucket to Basin].
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water management to economic development and poverty
eradication; and" (3) to "ensure the preservation of ecological
resource base for future generations." '211
The National Water Act of 1998 ("NWA")"' abolished private
ownership of water, 13 positioned the government to serve as the
"public trustee of water," ' 4 and "establish[ed] a compulsory
licensing system with the potential to redistribute water supply
more equitably among the populace." ' The Minister of Water
Affairs and Forestry, a named respondent in the Phiri rights
application, serves as the "public trustee" of South African's water
resources.2 16 "The Minister is ultimately responsible for ensuring
that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed, and
controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner for the benefit of
all persons and in accordance with the constitutional mandate."
'2 17
The NWA also established the basic human need ("BHNR")
standard, set at twenty-five liters per person per day, and required
that this minimum standard be met before water could be allocated
for uses beyond sustaining individual health.21
The newly elected ANC party found great support for this
legislation from its poor, black constituency, but, as Rose Francis
argues, failed to radically alter the status quo.219 Francis identifies
three of the NWA's pivotal shortcomings. First, the NWA
transfers water allocation responsibility to local municipal actors,
but neglects to secure sufficient financial support necessary to
develop sound infrastructure vital to efficient water distribution.22 °
211 Id.
212 National Water Act 36 of 1998.
213 Francis, supra note 80, at 161.
214 Ramin Pejan, The Right to Water: The Road to Justiciability, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 1181, 1203 (2004).
215 Francis, supra note 80, at 161; see also id. at 162 (describing the listed
"Purposes of the Act").
216 Robyn Stein, Water Law in a Democratic South Africa: A Country Case Study
Examining the Introduction of a Public Rights System, 83 TEX. L. REv. 2167, 2174
(2005).
217 Id.
218 Pejan, supra note 214, at 1203.
219 Francis, supra note 80, at 164.
220 Id. at 165.
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Second, by embracing a cost-recovery scheme, the NWA
effectively perpetuates a government policy seemingly
unconcerned with (or indifferent to) the plight of the poorest South
Africans.22' And finally, the NWA opened the door for a
privatized water services sector222 as local governments struggled
to meet the organizational and fiscal demands of utility
distribution and turned to private investment for answers.
Any exercise of water resource strategy must comply with the
founding principles around which the NWA was drafted. In other
words, implemented water distribution policies must realize the
objectives set forth by the Act, including the following: "(a)
meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations;
(b) promoting equitable access to water; (c) redressing the results
of past racial and gender discrimination; [and] (d) promoting the
efficient, sustainable, and beneficial use of water in the public
interest . *...,223 The NWA gives meaning to the water access
rights promoted by the Water Services Act (passed one year
earlier) by creating a national water reserve meant to satisfy basic
individual water needs. The water reserve provides water essential
to sustaining adequate health, such as water for drinking, cooking,
and maintaining personal hygiene.224 Policies such as prepaid
meters not only restrict equitable access to sufficient water
resources, but seemingly do so along lines of race and poverty.
The ideally uncompromised commitment of South Africa's
evolving democratic regulatory regime to ensure improved public
health225 must be re-examined in light of this development.
The Water Services Act of 1997 ("WSA") 226 recognizes the
cooperative call to action the Constitution demanded with respect
to water service circulation by assigning roles and responsibilities
to various government departments.227 It created government
221 See id. at 170. For further discussion on the consequences of the cost recovery
scheme, see id. at 170-78.
222 Id. at 165.
223 National Water Act 36 of 1998 s. 2.
224 Robyn Stein, Water Sector Reform in Southern Africa: Some Case Studies, in
HYDROPOLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 210, at 113, 117 [hereinafter Water Sector Reform].
225 Stein, supra note 216, at 2182.
226 Water Services Act 108 of 1997.
227 Pejan, supra note 214, at 1204-05.
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positions responsible for "ensur[ing] efficient, affordable,
economical and sustainable access to water services. 228  More
importantly, the WSA, in Section 4(3), specifically provides that
no person should be "denied access to basic water services for
non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the
relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable to pay
for basic services., 229 The Phiri application questions whether the
respondents have complied with this mandate.
Article 3 of the WSA states that "everyone has a right of
access to basic water supply and basic sanitation" and requires that
reasonable measures be taken by water service organizations to
realize this minimum obligation.2 30  Fulfillment of this mandate
placed on water service organizations was questioned by a South
African court in Manqele v. Durban Transitional Metropolitan
Council.231 Manqele addressed both Article 3 and Article 4(3) of
the WSA.232 In Manqele, the applicant was given six free
kiloliters of water per month by the Durban Transitional
Metropolitan Council (DTMC). 233  But, upon failing to pay for
excess water used, the applicant was served with written notice
and eventually had the water service disconnected.23 4  The
applicant argued that the WSA prohibited the DTMC from
disconnecting her basic water service while she was unable to pay,
citing Section 4(3).235
The Court refused to address policy issues presented before it
and, noting the applicant's prior tampering with the water
mechanism, determined that the disconnection was exercised in
accordance with the WSA.236 However, Salman M. A. Salman and
228 Id. at 1205.
229 Water Services Act 108 of 1997 s. 4(3)(c).
230 See SALMAN M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN
RIGHT To WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 80 & n.295 (2004) [hereinafter
SALMAN ET AL.].
231 Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council, 2002 (6) SA 423 (CC) (S.
Afr.); see also SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230 at 71 & nn.262 & 298.
232 Manqele, 2002 (6) SA at 424, 425.
233 Id. at 426.
234 Id.; SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230 at 80-81 & n.298.
235 Manqele, 2002 (6) SA at 427-28.
236 Id. at 427, 429-30.
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Siobhan Mclnerney-Lankford, in their book "The Human Right to
Water," note that had the challenge been framed in constitutional
terms, rather than challenging conformity with the WSA, the court
may have reached an alternative decision.2 37 The High Court now
has the opportunity to consider the constitutional fallout that
poverty-provoked disconnection creates.
South Africa's adoption of the Free Basic Water Policy
("FBW") in 2001 appeared to signal a firm commitment to
guaranteeing a "minimum basic quantity of potable water" for all
citizens.238 Rose Francis traces this pledge back to Section 27 of
the Constitution and the WSA's initial delineation of government
responsibility to achieve equitable access on a nationwide level. 9
The FBW, however, has been criticized for three principal
reasons: (1) underestimating the requisite minimum quantity
relative to international norms, (2) defining its policy on a per-
household basis rather than on individual terms, and (3) instituting
the cost-recovery system whereby citizens must pay for water
upon passing the free threshold volume. 240 The Phiri applicants
address each of these complaints.
The High Court will analyze the Phiri applicants' claims
within the above framework. In defining the substance reflected
in Section 27(1)(b) of the South African Constitution, the court
must necessarily determine the justiciability of this socioeconomic
right in light of national regulatory law, customary and
international declarations, and an evolving notion of
constitutionalism. The Constitutional Court has heard a number of
landmark cases since its inception that will presumably help
structure the High Court's analysis in this area. But, before
considering the developing constitutional law and interpretive
techniques implicit in unwinding the Bill of Rights, a brief
synopsis of the organization of the court system, the international
commentary on the legal and human right to sufficient water, and
the justiciability of socioeconomic claims is useful.
237 See SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 81 & n.298.
238 Francis, supra note 80, at 177.
239 Id. at 178-79.
240 Id. at 180-82.
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VI. The South African Judicial System
The Phiri application was filed in the High Court of South
Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division. The High Court's
jurisdiction over this matter is granted by Section 166 of the 1996
Constitution in accordance with Item 16 of Schedule 6. The
hierarchy of South African courts is traced back to the creation of
the Union in 1910.241 At that time, judicial authority was reserved
in two different branches, split between the Supreme Court of
South Africa, which had both appellate and local divisions, and a
handful of lower courts. The Constitutional Court, as created by
the interim Constitution, stands as the final and conclusive
reviewing judicial body for all constitutional issues.242 The
Constitutional Court and the Appellate Division were the two
appellate courts; the former handled all constitutional issues, and
the latter received all non-constitutional cases.243 Parties heard in
the Constitutional Court could not appeal to the Appellate
Division, and vice versa.
Though all courts operating prior to the enactment of the 1996
Constitution remained in existence upon the adoption of the new
Constitution, Section 166 set forth a new judicial hierarchy. The
courts include "(a) the Constitutional Court; (b) the Supreme
Court of Appeal; (c) the High Courts, including any high court of
appeal that may be established by an Act of Parliament to hear
appeals from High Courts... ."" Item 16 of Schedule 6 explains
that the old Appellate Division became the Supreme Court of
Appeal.245 Both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court
of Appeal (SCA) have Republic-wide jurisdiction, and both
exercise appellate authority.246 Whereas the Constitutional Court
hears strictly constitutional appeals, the SCA may hear appeals
that raise both constitutional and non-constitutional issues.247 The
Constitutional Court must also confirm any High Court and SCA
241 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 99.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 8, § 166.
245 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 sched. 6, item 16.
246 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 102.
247 Id.
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decisions that "declare Acts of Parliament, provincial legislation
and conduct of the President invalid," and may in certain
situations serve as a court of initial review for some constitutional
matters.248
The High Courts created by the 1996 Constitution replaced the
local divisions of the Supreme Court as defined prior to 1996; they
function as superior courts and possess limited jurisdiction.249
They hear a variety of constitutional cases, and, in fact, "may
decide any constitutional matter except matters within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court., 25" Thus, the
High Court can render conduct or legislation unconstitutional
unilaterally, or in the alternative, seek confirmation from the
Constitutional Court in a few select circumstances.25' Should the
Witwatersrand High Court directly apply the Constitution with no
consideration for the common law, any appeal may directly be
brought to the Constitutional Court.252 The Constitutional Court,
however, will not typically "exercise its jurisdiction to develop the
common law in constitutional matters without the matter having
first been dealt with by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 253
VII.International Treaties and Agreements: The Human and
Legal Right to Water
Consistent with Section 39(1) of the Constitution, the High
Court should consider international standards when interpreting
the relevant Bill of Rights provisions.254 South African citizens
represent a mere cross-section of impoverished people around the
globe who continue to struggle for sufficient water access. The
international community has responded in various ways, with
staggered success, in declaring the legal and human right to water.
How human rights treaties have addressed the right to water will
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 112.
251 Id.
252 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 129.
253 Id. For a summary of the path of appeals from High Court decisions under the
1996 Constitution, see generally id. at 130.
254 Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 85 (2004).
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help shape the South African constitutional understanding.
Only one-hundredth of one percent of all earth's water is
available for human consumption in a fresh, drinkable form.255 An
estimated 1.7 billion people have inadequate drinking water,
almost half of whom tolerate chronic shortages. 56 The Phiri
residents reflect a common scenario for poor, urban-dwelling
individuals in many countries, forced to purchase water from
vendors or prepaid meters while wealthy citizens, perhaps living
only a few miles away, receive municipal distribution at far lower
costs. 257 The most natural consequence of an inadequate potable
water supply is the deterioration of community health. 258 Disease
and conflict, both directly tied to water scarcity, will continue to
undermine development in countries facing the gravest water
shortages. As a result, the international community has begun to
speak in terms of a human right to water in the last half century,
doing so with increased tenacity within the last decade.
A. The Human Right to Water
Undeniably, water is essential to human survival.259 It is a
pillar of nourishment, hygiene, sanitation and agricultural
production. 26' Though the human right to water has not been
satisfactorily defined by international law to this point, water is
considered a vital component in securing other internationally
protected rights, such as the right to health and life.261
Alternatively, the right to water has been interpreted to fall within
255 Barbara Rose Johnston & John M. Donahue, Introduction to WATER, CULTURE
AND POWER: LOCAL STRUGGLES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 1, 1 (John M. Donahue &
Barbara Rose Johnston eds., 1998) [hereinafter WATER, CULTURE AND POWER].
256 Id.
257 See id. at 2.
258 See Ronnie Kasrils, Special Message, in HYDROPOLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 210, at 9, 9 [hereinafter Special
Message].
259 See Ignacio J. Alvarez, The Right to Water as a Human Right, in LINKING
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 71, 71 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant
eds., 2003).
260 Id.
261 Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 957 (2004); see also Alvarez, supra note 259, at 72 (listing the
human rights treaties and agreements that do not specifically mention the right to water).
[Vol. XXXIII
2008] THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WATER 551
the right to food, defined in Article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Article 25 states that "[e]veryone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food ....
Textually, this proclamation is not exhaustive, and one could
identify other fundamental rights pivotal to obtaining an adequate
standard of living. 263 Though the Declaration is not binding per se,
the most "fundamental provisions [of the General Assembly
resolution] are generally thought either to have passed into
customary international law, or to constitute an authoritative
interpretation of relevant U.N. Charter provisions, or both. ' 26
Two 1966 covenants provide the foundation for the evolving
debate over whether there is a human right to water. Both the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR")265 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR")266 contain "provisions from which the
right to water can be inferred." 267 Unfortunately, even if the state
parties to the ICESCR were to affirmatively establish a right to
water (rather than merely infer one), their realization of this right
would need only be "achieved progressively, 2 6 thus allowing
state actors more wiggle room to effectuate this legal obligation on
a timeline unlikely to trigger immediate results. Therefore, even a
facially strong commitment is potentially undermined by the
ICESCR's tolerance for piecemeal progress. For this reason,
proponents of economic, social and cultural rights have criticized
262 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 76 U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
263 Alvarez, supra note 259, at 73.
264 Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992).
265 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
266 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at
49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
267 Alvarez, supra note 259, at 73. The right to water can be inferred from Article
11 and Article 12 of ICESCR. Id. at 73-74.
268 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 28 (describing the differences in
enforceability between ICESCR and ICCPR); McCaffrey, supra note 264, at 8-9.
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ICESCR for inadequately providing oversight and implementation
procedures essential to implementing the textual commitment.269
ICCPR, on the other hand, "imposes an immediate obligation
'to respect and to ensure' the rights it proclaims."27  Also, its
expansive interpretation of the inherent human right to life
provided in Article 6 encompasses a firm recognition of the right
to water.27' Before turning to the ICCPR in depth, and then
considering more recent protocols expanding on the ICESCR,
inferences flowing from the ICESCR as originally passed warrant
further elaboration.
ICESCR is the instrument under which the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") operates.
In recognizing a handful of other fundamental rights, such as the
right to adequate housing and food, the right to develop, the right
to gain a living by work, and the right to enjoy cultural practices,
ICESCR has been interpreted to encompass the subordinate right
to water.273 Commentators, however, have questioned whether
ICESCR "merely set[s] forth hortatory goals" or "real rights, 27 4
also noting that ICESCR rights (including the right to water if
inferred) stand on unequal legal footing with human rights
instruments.275 As a result, enforcing conformance with ICESCR
declared rights lacks the backing of the law. In fact, it has been
said that the "rights" provided by the ICESCR are "more in the
269 Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate
the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 462 (2004).
270 McCaffrey, supra note 264, at 9.
271 See Alvarez, supra note 259, at 74. "There are disagreements over whether the
right to life could imply the right to water," but more recent doctrine has suggested that
the right to life has been improperly interpreted too narrowly. Id. Alvarez argues that
"the right to life comprises the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life,
and the right of every human being to have the appropriate means of subsistence and a
decent standard of living. In this context, the right to life would clearly encompass the
right to sanitary drinking water." Id.
272 Bluemel, supra note 261, at 969.
273 Id. at 969-70.
274 Dennis & Stewart, supra note 269, at 464.
275 Bluemel, supra note 261, at 971.
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nature of goals than of presently existing entitlements. 276
South Africa signed the ICESCR on October 3, 1994,277 and
ratified the agreement on December 10, 1998.7' As such, South
African laws should properly align with the ICESCR agenda.279
Should the Phiri water rights application succeed, perhaps South
African law will in turn adapt to more accurately encompass the
principles captured by the ICESCR.
The ICCPR created the Human Rights Committee ("HRC") to
monitor compliance with the rights it created. 28' Thus, state
signatories have a forum to voice complaints, and also remain
subject to citizen criticism. The HRC fields reports from State
Parties, reaches decisions regarding alleged human rights
grievances, and produces an annual report of its activities to the
General Assembly.28
Article 6 of the ICCPR declares: "Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. '' 282 Though this language
has not, over the last forty years, been considered to capture an
enforceable right to water,283 a broader interpretation of Article 6
rights has been embraced by members of the Human Rights
Commission in more contemporary times.284  Under this
understanding, the right to life entails the right to appropriate
means of subsistence, which in turn requires the right to clean,
safe drinking water.z85
276 McCaffrey, supra note 264, at 12; see also SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at
28-29 ("This is because the rights provided for in the ICESCR are often perceived as
'goals' or 'objectives' rather than 'true individual rights."').
277 Seleoane, supra note 140, at 40.
278 Right to Education Project, International Obligations and Access to Remedies,
Country-by-Country Tables: South Africa, http://www.right-to-education.org/content/
rights.and remedies/south.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
279 Seleoane, supra note 140, at 40.
280 Dennis & Stewart, supra note 269, at 477.
281 SALMAN ETAL., supra note 230, at 32-33.
282 ICCPR, supra note 266, at 53.
283 See generally McCaffrey, supra note 264, at 9 (describing the historical
reluctance of signing nations to recognize an enforceable right to water by virtue of the
ICCPR alone).
284 Id. at 10.
285 Id. at 10-11.
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Unlike the ICESCR, which protects "second generation
rights, 286  the ICCPR protects "first generation rights"
(traditionally considered those rights associated with democracy,
such as the right to life, privacy, equality, assembly and freedom
of expression) and is considered protective of "liberty-oriented
rights."2 7  As mentioned above, perhaps the most important
distinction between the ICESCR and the ICCPR lies with each
instrument's respective implementation mechanisms. Whereas
"Article 2 of the ICESCR obliges each State Party to take steps to
the maximum of its available resources to achieve progressively
the full realization of the rights under the ICESCR," Article 2 of
the ICCPR demands affirmative and immediate obligations on
State Parties subject to ICCPR jurisdiction.2 8
By the new millennium, the human right to water was at best
inferred, and at worst, downright unenforceable. Neither the
ICESCR nor the ICCPR, the two strongest proclamations of
international human rights, explicitly referenced the right to water,
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was no
different.28 9
Two human rights treaties, The Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, contained precise
references to a right to water.290 For example, Article 24 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes "the right of the
child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
and the right to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation., 29 1 In pursuing the realization of this right, states
are obligated to "combat disease and malnutrition, including
within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia,
the application of readily available technology and through the
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking
286 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 22.
287 Id. at 21.
288 Id. at 29.
289 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 262.
290 Violeta Petrova, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatization
and the Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577, 593 (2006).
291 Alvarez, supra note 259, at 75.
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water., 292 By way of this textual division of food and water rights,
the right to "clean drinking water" is thus independent of the right
to food, marking a divergent path from past human rights
interpretation that often stretched to find a subordinate right to
water within the right to adequate food.
International humanitarian law293 has recognized a right to
water in more specific terms than either the ICESCR or the
ICCPR. Within this framework, a 21st century human right to
water has been asserted by some scholars, though it still lacks
widespread direct textual support in the most important human
rights treaties.
B. General Comment 15
In light of these developments, and in search of a more
unyielding commitment to developing an internationally
recognized independent human right to water, ICESCR issued
General Comment 15 in November, 2002.294 In part, General
Comment 15 reads as follows: "Water is a limited natural resource
and a public good fundamental for life and health. The human
right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity.
It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights., 29 5 It
wasn't until 1988 that the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights began to release "General Comments" pertaining
to the ICESCR.296  The General Comments served the following
general purpose:
The Committee endeavours, through its general comments,
292 Id.
293 Petrova, supra note 290, at 593-94 & n.106; see also Alvarez, supra note 259, at
75 (describing relevant provisions from the Geneva Convention).
294 Bluemel, supra note 261, at 971; see also SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 53
("General Comment No. 15 was issued by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights at its Twenty-ninth session, held in Geneva, November 11 to 29, 2002.").
295 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to
Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment
15]; Rachel Welch, Comment, And Not a Drop to Drink: Water Privatization, Pseudo-
Sovereignty, and the Female Burden, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 323-24 (2006).
296 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 45.
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to make the experience gained so far through the examination of
these reports available for the benefit of all States parties in order
to assist and promote their further implementation of the
Covenant; to draw the attention of the States parties to
insufficiencies disclosed by a large number of reports; to suggest
improvements in the reporting procedures and to stimulate the
activities of the States parties, the international organizations and
the specialized agencies concerned in achieving progressively
and effectively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
Covenant. Whenever necessary, the Committee may, in the light
of the experience of State parties and of the conclusions which it
has drawn therefrom, revise and update its general comments.297
With the implementation of the General Comment model, the
ICESCR assumed traits of the "sanctional model" more
historically associated with the ICCPR.298
Though the General Comments are not legally binding, per se,
on State Parties to the ICESCR, their legal significance should not
be understated.299  The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights adopted an increasingly quasi-judicial posture, and
in light of a traditionally absent authoritative body monitoring
State Parties' compliance with the ICESCR, the General
Comments are considered an important tool in both asserting and
enforcing declarations of human rights. Though the General
Comments do not expand State Parties' obligations under the
ICESCR as it was initially constructed, their greatest utility is
served in clarifying and interpreting the vague provisions of an
outdated treaty. "General comments are therefore critical
interpretations of the provisions of, and obligations under, the
ICESCR, which have a significant bearing on the enforcement of
the ICESCR, and the realization and observance of the rights it
contains."3 °°
General Comment 15 addresses both the substantive and
297 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Report on the Third Session, at 87, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (1989).
298 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 47.
299 See id. at 49 (describing the context in which General Comments have become
important in monitoring State Party action); see also Bluemel, supra note 261, at 973
(describing General Comments' role in assisting international bodies in determining
whether a State has complied with the ICESCR to a sufficient degree).
300 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 53.
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procedural elements of the human right to water.3"' Substantively,
General Comment 15 provides minimum guidelines for
"availability, quality, and accessibility" of sanitary water;
procedurally, it details the "right to information concerning water
issues, the right to participate, and the right to effective
remedies. 3 °2
The Phiri water applicants, presumably, have legitimate
substantive and procedural complaints with water allocation in
Soweto along the lines of Comment 15. In fact, Paragraph 2 of
General Comment 15 speaks almost directly to the troubles of the
Phiri residents in describing the egregious potentialities associated
with an unrealized human right to water. Paragraph 2 in part
reads:
The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe,
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for
personal and domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water
is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk
of water-related diseases and to provide for consumption,
cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements.30 3
Furthermore, paragraph 12, in parts (a), (b), and (c), details the
substantive requirements of availability, quality and accessibility
of sanitary water.3°4 The Phiri applicants describe a water reality
that touches on all three prongs of General Comment 15's
substantive core.
The legal facets of General Comment 15 translate into both
affirmative and negative obligations placed on both state and, at
times, non-state actors.30 5 To this end, Paragraph 10 declares:
The right to water contains both freedoms and entitlements. The
freedoms include the right to maintain access to existing water
supplies necessary for the right to water, and the right to be free
from interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary
disconnections or contamination of water supplies. By contrast,
the entitlements include the right to a system of water supply and
301 Petrova, supra note 290, at 596.
302 Id.
303 General Comment 15, supra note 295, 2.
304 See generally id, 12 (providing explicit directions on how to satisfy the
General Comment's requirements).
305 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 66.
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management that provides equality of opportunity for people to
306
enjoy the right to water.
Erik Bluemel asserts that by "categorizing a right to water as a
human right," and speaking in terms of entitlement rather than
charity, General Comment 15 accelerates the achievement of basic
water access, ordains fresh water a legal entitlement, and turns
traditionally vulnerable social groups into empowered and
influential policy activists.0 7
According to Paragraph 20, three specific legal obligations fall
on State Parties: "obligations to respect, obligations to protect and
obligations tofulfil.' '38 As these legal obligations directly relate to
the Phiri water rights case, State Parties like Johannesburg Water
must "refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the
enjoyment of the right to water"3 9 and, more specifically, are
prohibited from denying or limiting equal access to adequate
water.31° In addition, the South African government, under
Paragraph 23, must "prevent third parties," including "individuals,
groups, corporations and other entities" from "interfering in any
way with the enjoyment of the right to water., 311  Together,
Paragraphs 20 and 23 address the behavior of all respondents, both
public and private, in the Phiri case.
Paragraph 24 addresses the privatization of water distribution
schemes, like that operating in Soweto, by outlining the proper
regulatory oversight State Parties must exercise over third parties
controlling water services. In short, "States parties must prevent
[third parties] from compromising equal, affordable, and physical
access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water. ' '312  Moreover,
prepaid meters and similar payment mechanisms must comply
with Paragraph 27, which states that "[a]ny payment for water
services has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that
these services, whether privately or publicly provided, are
306 General Comment 15, supra note 295, 10.
307 Bluemel, supra note 261, at 973.
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affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. 3 *3
Most notably, Paragraph 27 appears to condemn the social
injustice plaguing the Phiri community by stating, in the final
sentence, "[e]quity demands that poorer households should not be
disproportionately burdened with water expenses as compared to
richer households. 314
The status of international human rights law with respect to
water rights, and its corresponding influence on South African
law, remains somewhat indeterminate. One scholar, however, has
gone so far as to say that, though international human rights law
has not created legally binding obligations on states, it has
pressured some states, such as South Africa, to more
comprehensively account for the human right to water by virtue of
domestic legislation.315 Under this rationale, the South African
Constitution not only declares an important domestic legal
obligation, but directly reflects and endorses an international
priority.
General Comment 15, Salman and McInerney-Lankford
submit, represents "further evidence that there is an incipient right
to water evolving in public international law today."'3 16 How this
maturing international regime will affect the High Court's decision
remains uncertain, and may ultimately hinge on the Court's
propensity towards reaching a judgment focused primarily on the
constitutional issues.
It is interesting to note, however, that General Comment 15
continually emphasizes the issue of affordability, 317 one of the
principal components of the Phiri rights claim. The Comment
appears to equate low cost water with free water, and most water
experts have firmly spoken out against free water programs.1 8
What follows, therefore, is the natural conclusion that the High
Court will focus its inquiry not on the simple privatization,
necessarily, or even payment based distribution of water in Soweto
in and of itself. Rather, affordability should be measured relative
313 Id. 27.
314 General Comment 15, supra note 295, 27.
315 Bluemel, supra note 261, at 977.
316 SALMAN ETAL., supra note 230, at 89.
317 Id. at 70.
318 Id.
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to the economic conditions unique to the Phiri community, and
reconsideration employed for the threshold allocation point (six
kiloliters) after which payment is required.
South Africa, in the post-apartheid era, is no longer isolated
from the international legal establishment. Domestic programs,
like Operation Gcin'amanzi, unquestionably serve many beneficial
fiscal purposes, but may at the same time compromise South
Africa's commitment to human rights norms as embodied in
international law. As mentioned earlier, the South African
Constitution explicitly urges the consideration of international law
by courts interpreting the Bill of Rights;319 thus, it is reasonable to
anticipate the High Court's consideration of General Comment 15
and other similar international treaties.
Ironically, from the Phiri residents' perspective, the South
African Constitution at once both represents an "emerging
recognition of the human right to water in [a] domestic legal
context ..."320 and a promise regrettably unfulfilled. The South
African experience to date indicates how a human rights approach
to water can at times clash with a cost-efficient program aimed to
limit waste.32 A human rights approach to water privatization will
continue to impress international scrutiny upon multinational
water companies, and secure improved protection for those low-
income global citizens most substantially bearing the burden of a
privatized water industry.322 At times when government appears to
prioritize economic objectives ahead of fundamental human rights,
the true breadth and value of a rights-based approach will be
revealed. But before a human rights approach is fully achieved,
access to adequate water simply can not rest primarily on the
ability to pay.
319 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Section 39(l)(b)
prompts reviewing courts to consider international law when interpreting the South
African Bill of Rights).
320 SALMAN ET AL., supra note 230, at 88.
321 See generally Bleumel, supra note 261, at 980 (describing the inherent tension
between a human rights approach to water and implementing a financially viable water
infrastructure).
322 Petrova, supra note 290, at 612.
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VIII.The Structure of Bill of Rights Litigation: Preliminary
Procedural Issues
Bill of Rights litigation in South African courts can be divided
into distinct stages. Prior to addressing the substantive human
rights concerns of the litigants involved, a reviewing court must
initiate compliance with certain procedural guidelines.323 Before
either the substantive stage or the remedial phase"' commence, the
court must determine the breadth of the specific Bill of Rights
provisions in question, how they should be interpreted,325 and
whether any Section 36 limitations apply.326
According to lain Currie and Johan de Waal, the procedural
stage is comprised of three questions: (1) "Does the Bill of Rights
apply in the dispute between the parties," and if so, "how does the
Bill of Rights apply . . . ?;"9'3 2 7 (2) "Is the issue to be decided
justiciable?;,,32" and (3) "Does the court have jurisdiction to grant
the relief claimed?, 329  The second inquiry is of particular
importance because this question's answer directly determines
whether the High Court can even contemplate the remedy sought
by the Phiri applicants. Absent an affirmative response, the High
Court would not have proceeded to consider the substantive law
discussed above, and therefore the justiciability of socioeconomic
claims is a central issue to the evolution of a developing South
African constitutionalism.
IX. Constitutional Court Precedent and the Justiciability of
Socioeconomic Claims
Ensuring the highest human right standards may in turn
compromise a state's desired financial scheme. Judicial review,
therefore, of alleged human rights violations necessarily requires
"weighing the critical needs of individual citizens against the
323 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 24.
324 See id. at 27-28 (describing the onus of litigants to declare the remedy requested
and the respondents corresponding duty to rebut).
325 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 39.
326 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
327 BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 28.
328 Id.
329 Id.
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legitimate budgetary constraints of the state."33 To say the least,
members of the Witwatersrand High Court, and similarly situated
judges, face the challenging task of shaping a presently immature
Constitutional theory around and with a sound economic regime.
Though the South African Bill of Rights is widely regarded as
one of the most progressive human rights instruments in existence
today,331 the South African judiciary, and the Constitutional Court
in particular, has been criticized for failing to realize many of the
promises the Constitution purportedly makes.332 Some of the more
unfavorable scholarly commentary takes issue with the Court's
unwillingness to adopt a "minimum core approach," '333 choosing
instead to implement a reasonableness approach in exercising its
constitutional jurisprudence.334
The judiciary's proper role in enforcing the constitutional
socioeconomic protections in question has not been fully
developed. 35  But, for prospective purposes, the Constitutional
Court declared socioeconomic rights justiciable and subject to
protection from government intrusion.336 In this context, the
Constitutional Court has forged its role in enforcing
socioeconomic rights, and rejected any enduring perception of
non-justiciability. 37 Richard Goldstone goes so far as to say that
the "Constitutional Court has successfully enforced the
constitution's provisions for social and economic rights while
330 Richard J. Goldstone, A South African Perspective on Social and Economic
Rights, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Winter 2006, at 4, 4.
331 Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 2.
332 See Karin Lehmann, In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 163, 164-
65 (2006) ("[S]cholars have described the Constitutional Court's socio-economic rights
jurisprudence as 'timid,' 'deferential,' and 'flawed."').
333 Id. at 165. The "minimum core approach" is the popular notion that the Court
should identify the minimum core of each fundamental socioeconomic right identified in
the Constitution when challenged in a judicial setting. See id.
334 Id.
335 See Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 3 (noting that some commentators have
suggested that the legislature and executive are better suited to enforce the fundamental
rights protection outlined in the Constitution and not the judiciary).
336 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA at 800-01, para. 78.
337 David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights Through
Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 64 (2006).
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balancing the state's interest in managing its political affairs, 338 a
truly lofty declaration that gives hope to the Phiri applicants before
the High Court.
By virtue of a handful of historical decisions, the
Constitutional Court has shaped the framework for Bill of Rights
adjudication likely to be utilized by the High Court. On a number
of occasions, the Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to
consider the parameters of the socioeconomic guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights, and the corresponding duty of the
state to realize these objectives. Exactly how the Constitutional
Court has previously addressed both the right to housing and
healthcare should guide the High Court's reasoning regarding the
Phiri application.339
Central to the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in this area
has been consideration for the availability of state resources.34 ° In
the three major socioeconomic cases discussed below, the
Constitutional Court has recognized, to varying degrees, the
"utilitarian considerations" that in many ways either directly or
indirectly threaten the constitutional pledge of elevated
humanitarian protection.34'
A. Constitutional Court Precedent: Socioeconomic Rights
Litigation
Were the Phiri applicants before the High Court in 1997, their
prospects for victory immediately following the seminal decision
handed down in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health342 would be
bleak at best.34 3  At this early stage of socioeconomic rights
338 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 4.
339 Ramin Pejan promoted the same theory when he asserted that "the South African
Constitutional Court has developed jurisprudence regarding economic and social rights
applicable to the potential justiciability of the right to water." Pejan, supra note 214, at
1194-95.
340 Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 3.
341 See Lehmann, supra note 332, at 166 (noting that the Court has recognized the
tension that exists between absolute protection of individual rights and inadequate
disposable resources).
342 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
343 Richard Goldstone declares this initial Constitutional Court decision regarding
socioeconomic rights the "worst possible beginning [from the humanitarian
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
litigation, the Constitutional Court adopted a more restrictive
interpretation of the new Constitution's commitment to
socioeconomic equality and, therefore, claims such as those held
by the Phiri applicants would have had little hope. Initial reaction
to this disheartening decision provoked fears that the Court had
rendered the socioeconomic rights provisions meaningless in
practice.344
The issue presented before the Court was "whether a public
hospital unconstitutionally failed to provide renal dialysis services
to a terminally ill man who suffered from diabetes, ischemic heart
disease, and cerebro-vascular disease. 345  Soobramoney, the ill
patient, required dialysis once a week, but was denied priority
treatment in favor of patients who could realize a short-term and
full recovery.346 A High Court injunction initially compelled the
government to provide the dialysis treatment, but the
Constitutional Court reversed.3 47  The right to health care, as
announced in Section 27 of the Bill of Rights (the same clause
containing the right to water), was evaluated for the first time in
this context.
Though the Court recognized that denying Mr. Soobramoney's
request for dialysis would provoke an earlier death, it held that his
condition did not trigger the emergency medical treatment
language contained within Section 27.348 The Court reasoned that
a contrary decision would have mistakenly prioritized terminal
illnesses over less threatening medical conditions, thus
jeopardizing the state's ability to fund preventive healthcare
programs in light of limited disposable financial resources .349 The
Court extended tremendous deference to the hospital's decision on
how best to allocate medical treatment, reflecting the judiciary's
perspective]." Goldstone, supra note 330, at 5.
344 Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-
Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REv. 137, 145-46 (2003).
345 Id. at 146.
346 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 5. For a more complete synopsis of the
Soobramoney facts, see Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA at 769-70, paras. 1-7.
347 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 5.
348 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(3); see also supra note 137 and accompanying
text.
349 Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA at 773, para. 19.
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willingness to defer to institutional commitments grounded in
reasonableness.35 °  In noting the objectively heavy financial
burden that Mr. Soobramoney's treatment produced, at a cost of
nearly 60,000 rand per year, 5 ' the Court, though perhaps
begrudgingly,352 tipped the balancing inquiry in favor of a
conservative budgetary approach and against a more human rights
oriented methodology.
In simple terms, Mr. Soobramoney's sustained health,
unquestionably requiring a burdensome financial commitment
shouldered by the state, was sacrificed in favor of pursuing the
more advanced health of others.353 The Court phrased its decision
in exceedingly deferential terms, perhaps an indication of its early
trepidation for asserting a judicial voice in traditionally
administrative or legislative conversations.354
Even though the Court was unwilling to instruct the
government on how medical supplies were to be distributed, or
how hospitals should spend their money, the Court did note that
violations of the equality clause355  would trigger judicial
interruption.356 In this sense, early Bill of Rights jurisprudence
reflected the immediate concern for racial equality that developed
naturally from the anti-apartheid movement. This somewhat
shallow understanding of the scope of the new Constitution's
human rights purpose fortunately gave way to a more profound
exercise in socioeconomic egalitarianism by the turn of the
350 Id. at 776, para. 29.
351 Id. at 775-76, para. 28.
352 See id. at 776-77, para. 31 ("One cannot but have sympathy for the appellant and
his family, who face the cruel dilemma of having to impoverish themselves in order to
secure the treatment that the appellant seeks in order to prolong his life .... But the
state's resources are limited and the appellant does not meet the criteria for admission to
the renal dialysis programme.").
353 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 167.
354 The Constitutional Court, in Soobramoney, stated that "[the] choices [made by
the hospital] involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the
health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon priorities to be met. A court
will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political
organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters."
Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA, at 776, para. 29.
355 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
356 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 5.
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century.
In evaluating Soobramoney's importance in terms of its
precedential authority, some commentators have argued that the
decision really failed to establish guidelines for future
socioeconomic jurisprudence.357 But Karin Lehmann notes, while
citing Craig Scott and Philip Alston's analytical remarks on
Soobramoney's legacy, that many other scholars endorse the
utilitarian decision employed by both the state and the Court in
unpacking the Soobramoney dilemma.358 In this respect, the civil
libertarian fears born from the sobering Soobramoney decision35 9
that the South African judiciary would remain unresponsive to
individual rights and personal freedom infringement by the state
may have, indeed, been premature.
Whereas Soobramoney fell short of espousing a concrete
adjudicatory framework for constitutional rights, the Government
of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom36 ° decision was quite
progressive in this respect. Grootboom addressed the right to
housing as guaranteed by Section 26 of the Constitution.3 6' The
applicants before the Court represented hundreds of squatter-
dwellers who had been displaced from their homes following a
flood.362 Faced with intolerable living conditions,363 the squatters,
including Mrs. Grootboom, moved onto private property, where
they were eventually forcefully evicted3 64  by the private
357 See Mubangizi, supra note 63, at 6 & n.33.
358 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 167 (citing Craig Scott & Philip Alston,
Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on
Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. ON HUm. RTS. 206
(2000)).
359 As a side note, Mr. Soobramoney died within one hour of the Constitutional
Court decision. Goldstone, supra note 330, at 5. When members of the media
congregated at his home to record his reaction to the earlier rendered judgment, Mr.
Soobramoney succumbed to a stroke. Id.
360 Gov't of the Rep. of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) (S. Afr.).
361 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 171.
362 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 6.
363 The squatters lived in shacks and most of them lacked water and electricity.
Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 55, para. 7. Sewage accumulated at alarming rates, and
small shacks inadequately protected large families from the elements. Id.
364 The squatters' temporary homes were bulldozed and their possessions destroyed
in an attempt to push them off the private property. Id. at 55-56, para. 10.
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landowner.365  Upon returning to their deplorable squatter
settlements as a last alternative, the squatters found their old
homes occupied and became officially homeless.366 The squatters
then struggled to erect sturdy shelter on a local municipal sports
field, and the local government was unreceptive to their pleas for
assistance.367
The Grootboom applicants filed a suit against the Cape Town
provisional government,3 68 claiming that the government had
failed to "take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [the
right to adequate housing] 3 69 guaranteed by Section 26(1).370
Grootboom and her fellow applicants demanded adequate
temporary housing "pending implementation of the programme to
provide adequate housing,"37' but the Court refused their request,
concluding that Section 26 did not warrant immediate relief
consistent with those commands.372 The Court did, however,
declare the housing program unconstitutional.373 In doing so, it
laid the foundation for a standard of review applicable to
socioeconomic claims premised on the Constitution's text.
The unanimous Court decision reasserted the justiciability of
socioeconomic rights 374 and went on to declare the state's housing
program unconstitutional by virtue of its unreasonableness.375
365 Pejan, supra note 214, at 1196.
366 Id.
367 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 56, para. 11.
368 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 6.
369 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 26(2).
370 Id. at ch. 2, § 26(1).
371 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 57, para. 14.
372 See Lehmann, supra note 332, atl7l; Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 86, para. 95
("Neither s 26 nor s 28 entitles the respondents (who won in the High Court] to claim
shelter or housing immediately upon demand.").
373 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 171-72.
374 See Kende, supra note 344, at 143. The Court cited the First Certification
Judgment, Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.),
and explicitly stated that, although budgetary implications stem from enforcing
fundamental socioeconomic fights, these implications are not a bar to realizing the
justiciability of socioeconomic rights. Kende, supra note 344, at 143.
375 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 171-72.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Specifically, the negative obligation placed on South African
states by Section 26 demanded that they "desist from preventing or
impairing the right of access to adequate housing. 376 The Court
further emphasized the importance of socioeconomic rights,377 and
rejected an international human rights approach that embraced the
notion of a "minimum core" level of socioeconomic protection, as
alluded to earlier. Instead, the court adopted a reasonableness test,
asking "whether the measures taken by the state to realise the right
afforded by section 26 are reasonable." '378
In assessing the reasonableness of the state housing program,
the Court, as a preliminary matter, applauded the state's medium
and long-term housing approach.379 However, in condemning the
short-term housing strategy, the Court held that the state failed to
act reasonably, and defined this measuring stick as follows:
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the
degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to
realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be
ignored by the measured aimed at achieving realisation of the
right .... If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to
respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass
the test.38°
The reasonableness inquiry revealed a blind eye turned (if
turned at all) towards the poorest members of society. Thus, while
the Court favorably reviewed many elements of the housing
scheme, the predicament of the homeless undermined the
program's constitutional legitimacy."' In the end, the Court shied
away from impeding the government's discretion in how to
effectuate the constitutional mandate, but instructed that at least
376 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 66, para. 34.
377 For a further discussion of the importance of socioeconomic rights, in the
language of the Grootboom court, see Kende, supra note 344, at 143.
378 Grootboom, 2000 (1) SA at 66, para. 33.
379 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 172.
380 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 69, para. 44. For a further discussion of what
"reasonable" meant in the area of housing, see Pejan, supra note 214, at 1197.
381 Kende, supra note 344, at 145 (citing Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 79, para. 66)
("'The nationwide housing programme falls short of obligations imposed upon national
government to the extent that it fails to recognise that the State must provide for relief for
those in desperate need."').
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some budgetary consideration be adequately exercised with the
poorest communities in mind.
Grootboom can be, and was, distinguished from Soobramoney
on many levels. For the purposes of this piece, the most notable
distinction lies in the commitment to the more widespread public
interest reflected more notably in the Grootboom decision. In
other words, the adverse consequences of the Soobramoney
decision were in many ways mirrored by important countervailing
social interests that might, some would argue, have demanded the
sacrifice of one for the betterment of others. In Grootboom,
however, jeopardizing the realization of adequate shelter would
have directly undermined the social initiative the housing
program, in essence, sought to incorporate.382 If visualized along
the lines of a broad spectrum, the water rights application falls, at
best, squarely in tow with the Grootboom decision or, at worst,
merely on its side of the scale. A water allocation scheme that
fails to adequately account for those "whose needs are the most
urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is in most
peril" '383 cannot be constitutionally sustained. The adverse
consequences that flow from such a program directly undermine
the legitimacy of the policy.
Furthermore, the Grootboom Court appeared to grasp its
decisive role in alleviating the socioeconomic injustice that
plagued South Africa during apartheid, and unfortunately persists
today. One particularly poignant paragraph of the Grootboom
decision practically preconceives the complaint filed by the Phiri
residents. In this respect, though the underlying social issue is
different, the general theme resonates through all struggling
communities. The Grootboom Court noted that
Unless the plight of these communities is alleviated,
people may be tempted to take the law into their own
hands in order to escape these conditions. The case
brings home the harsh reality that the Constitution's
promise of dignity and equality for all remains for many
a distant dream .... Self-help ... cannot be tolerated ...
384
382 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 172.
383 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at 69, para. 44.
384 Id. at 53, para. 2.
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In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court successfully saw
beyond the illegal activity of citizens enduring insufferable living
conditions and addressed the constitutionality of the state action
that provoked the prohibited behavior. A consistent application of
this standard suggests that the High Court will view the claims of
the Phiri residents through a similarly unrelenting, and
conceivably sympathetic, lens.
Like Soobramoney, the third of the three landmark
socioeconomic cases heard by the Constitutional Court addressed
the issue of adequate healthcare. Minister of Health v. Treatment
Action Campaign"' was decided in 2002, and further elaborated
on the methodology the Court first announced in Grootboom.386 A
"reasonableness" standard was again employed, in this instance to
evaluate government provided access to HIV medicine.387
The Constitutional Court assessed the government's anti-HIV
program and, more specifically, the use (or non-use) of a then-new
drug called Nevirapine. Nevirapine, according to the World
Health Organization, could prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS from
infected pregnant mothers to their unborn fetuses or newborn
babies. 388 The government was hesitant to introduce Nevirapine
into mainstream medicine 389 and, even upon distributing the new
drug, availability was restricted tremendously.39
The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), an HIV/AIDS
advocacy group, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of
385 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No 2)
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
386 Marcus, supra note 337, at 64.
387 Id. The horrific AIDS epidemic is well-documented. See Kende, supra note
344, at 147 (describing relevant statistics with respect to AIDS-related deaths); see also
Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 728, para. 1 (describing the HIV/AIDS
pandemic as "an incomprehensible calamity").
388 See Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) (SA) 721 (CC), at 2 and
accompanying note. See also id. 12 for overview of Nevirapine.
389 Kende, supra note 344, at 147-48; see also Treatment Action Campaign, 2002
(5) SA at 743-44, paras. 48-56 (detailing the policy of distribution).
390 See Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 729, para. 4 ("The programme
impose[d] restrictions on the availability of Nevirapine in the public health sector....
The applicants contended that these restrictions [were] unreasonable when measured
against the Constitution .... ."). For a more comprehensive account of the
"[glovemment policy on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV," see id.
at 741-42, paras. 40-43.
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the government's limited distribution program.39" ' The program in
question limited the use of the promising new drug to a handful of
designated test sites392 and expressly forbade doctors practicing in
other public health institutions from dispensing Nevirapine.393 As
a result, Nevaripine was available at only two sites per province,394
a consequence of the government's own uncertainty regarding the
safety and efficacy of the relatively untested drug.395 For practical
purposes, the brunt of the restricted distribution scheme was felt
by families unable to pay for private healthcare, the majority of
whom lacked access to the research and training sites where
Nevirapine was available. 396  TAC demanded that the drug be
readily available through the public health care system.
The Court initially reflected on both Soobramoney and
Grootboom,"9  and firmly declared the justiciability of
socioeconomic rights.399  Briefly stated, the Court asked itself
"whether the applicant ha[d] shown that the measures adopted by
the government to provide access to health care service for HIV-
positive mothers and their newborn babies [fell] short of its
obligation under the Constitution. '40 The Court dismissed amici
391 Pejan, supra note 214, at 1199.
392 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 174; see also Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5)
SA at 753-54, para. 92 (summarizing the relevant evidence before the Court, recounting
the specifics of the challenged program, and setting forth the corresponding analytical
framework for understanding the program's constitutionality).
393 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 731-32, para. 11.
394 Id. at 731, para. 10.
395 See id. at 732-33, para. 15. The government sought to "develop and monitor its
human and material resources nationwide for the delivery of a comprehensive package of
testing and counseling, dispensing of Nevirapine and follow-up services to pregnant
women attending at public health institutions." Id. It appears that the government was
mostly driven by a concern over the escalating costs of staffing and allocation that would
accompany a more immediate distribution of the drug on a more widespread scale. Id. at
732-33, 753, paras. 15, 49.
396 Id. at 733, para. 17. For a summary of the Applicants' case, see Treatment
Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 734-35, para. 19.
397 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 7.
398 See Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 736, paras. 23-24 (describing
the affirmative obligations placed on the State by virtue of the socioeconomic
constitutional provisions).
399 Id. at 736, para. 25.
400 Id.
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arguments that a "minimum core" approach" 1 was appropriate,
rather demonstratively asserting that "[i]t is impossible to give
everyone access even to a 'core' service immediately. All that is
possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is that it act
reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights
identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.'4 2
With respect to its own role in enforcing the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the Court's self-proclaimed "function in respect of
socio-economic rights," it was said, "is directed towards ensuring
that legislative and other measures taken by the state are
reasonable. '"4' 3 Paragraph 28 of the Treatment Action Campaign
decision sets forth the standard of review likely applicable to the
Phiri water rights application, and is perhaps most illustrative of
how the High Court will process the tension between the
municipal fiscal agenda and the alleged fundamental rights
violations. It reads in full:
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court
orders could have multiple social and economic consequences
for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a
restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, to require the
state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and
to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.
Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have
budgetary implications, but are not in themselves directed at
rearranging budgets. In this way, the judicial, legislative and
executive functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.40 4
The above standard of review appears to envision a restrained
role for the Courts, but as ultimately proved, the Court's decision
embraced an active role in ensuring the reasonableness of any
government policy. Any initial deference the City of
Johannesburg enjoys should, accordingly, not prevent the High
Court from finding in the applicant's favor.
Applying this standard of review, the Court in Treatment
Action Campaign unanimously condemned the government's
401 See id. at 737-40, paras. 26-36 (discussing Grootboom and previous decisions
involving the "minimum core" approach).
402 Id. at 739-40, para. 35.
403 Id. at 740, para. 36.
404 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 740, para. 38.
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restrictive program and unequivocally attached fixed obligations
upon the state to provide the drug free of charge, in addition to
counseling and testing. 5 The decision ultimately rested in
notions of equality: some mothers could not be denied while
others received the treatment with relative ease.40 6
Speaking more broadly to the socioeconomic guarantees
contained in the Constitution and, one could argue, envisioning a
water rights claim such as that before the High Court today, the
Court stated: "[t]hese are the socio-economic rights entrenched in
the Constitution, and the state is obliged to take reasonable
legislative and other measures within its available resources to
achieve the progressive realisation of each of them."4 7 The scope
of these emerging doctrinal words will dictate the constitutionality
of the prepaid water program. A reasonableness inquiry consistent
with Treatment Action Campaign demands remedial judicial
action issued against the named respondents in the Phiri water
rights application.
A favorable outcome in the Phiri case may be forestalled by
one large discrepancy between the facts presented in Treatment
Action Campaign and those described in the Phiri application.
Namely, the government in Treatment Action Campaign freely
acknowledged that more widespread distribution of Nevirapine
was plausible, from a resource allocation standpoint, and the Court
concluded that the costs associated with improved counseling and
testing were negligible.4"8  Conversely, the government has
installed prepaid water meters and implemented Operation
Gcin'amanzi in an effort to better utilize the government's
resources, not out of preference, but out of purported need. In
light of the water shortage facing South Africa generally, and the
statistics highlighting waste and misuse in communities like
Soweto, the High Court may find the costs associated with
imposing a stricter, and far more demanding, notion of the
constitutional right to water untenable. Ultimately, how the High
Court evaluates the water resources available to the state and the
costs incurred in meeting the Phiri applicants' demands will, for
405 See id. at 754, para. 95.
406 Goldstone, supra note 330, at 5.
407 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 754, para. 94.
408 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 175-76.
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better or worse, determine the scope of judicial review.
The Treatment Action Campaign decision can be both
applauded and questioned. In many respects, the decision
highlights the judiciary's role in enforcing the often unworkably
vague provisions of the Bill of Rights. Merely a decade into their
evolution, socioeconomic rights are unquestionably justiciable.
The Constitutional Court, and lower courts alike, serve an
invaluable role in protecting the right to healthcare, housing and,
going forward, the right to water. But immediate victories, such as
those obtained in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign, in
practice could eventually prove reflective of a more troubling legal
doctrine. Though the modem Court has made great strides in
effectuating the socioeconomic rights provided in Sections 26 and
27, a more conservative interpretation of the Paragraph 38409
language contained in the Treatment Action Campaign decision
could eventually threaten what presently appears to be developing
humanitarian-based methodology.
From one perspective, the High Court is "ill-suited to
adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple
social and economic consequences" for the Phiri community.410
Following this line of reasoning, the High Court's reasonableness
inquiry necessarily will be "restrained and focused," intent on
"[not] rearranging budgets." '' Under this approach, the court may
cautiously evaluate the activity of the City of Johannesburg and
Johannesburg Water in a different light as compared to the
Treatment Action Campaign case.
Another reason to believe the court may treat the Phiri case
differently is that the AIDS pandemic at the center of the
Treatment Action Campaign controversy was the subject of
intense international attention. Though the water shortage in
South Africa has garnered media interest, the adoption by the
Court of a somewhat more restrictive understanding of the state
obligation in this area is likely not to create a similar uproar.412
409 See supra notes 401-402 and accompanying text.
410 See Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 740, para. 38.
411 Id.
412 See Lehmann, supra note 332, at 176 (describing how the government and HIV
positive pregnant women had coinciding interests, thus provoking the eventual
Treatment Action Campaign decision). The government's umbrella interest in pursuing
a sound fiscal agenda may not align as well with the Phiri residents' interest in acquiring
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Regrettably, the cost of a more lenient reasonableness standard, at
least in terms of minimum government constitutional compliance,
will be incurred by the politically voiceless.
B. The "Reasonableness" Standard and the Implications for
the Right to Water
Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign provide the
adjudicatory blueprint for a Constitutional challenge, such as the
Phiri water rights application, to state sponsored water policy.
Both cases were, and still are, considered landmark victories for
the socioeconomically deprived citizens of South Africa. But
insulated triumphs have not shielded the Constitutional Court from
theoretical criticism. Karin Lehmann argues that the "court's
undue and excessive deference to the legislature and executive," as
manifested by the "criteria used by the court to decide whether
executive action is unconstitutional" and "the form of relief
granted by the court when a particular action is declared
unconstitutional," are two focal points of scholarly contention.41 3
The Court digests government policy and, shedding a
subjective understanding of state and municipal practice in favor
of a more objective perspective, the Court evaluates the
government policy in question using a reasonableness test.414 As
discussed earlier, the ICESCR underscored the progressive
realization approach towards achieving socioeconomic rights
improvement 4 5 and the Constitutional Court has seemingly
endorsed this methodology. 4 6 By invoking the "reasonable"
test,417 the Court does not necessarily force the government's hand;
on the contrary, it assesses the government's strategy relative to its
more free water.
413 Id. at 177.
414 Pejan, supra note 214, at 1201; see also Lehmann, supra note 332, at 177
("[T]he court will adjudge a particular policy or program constitutional if it is rational,
reasonable, and made in good faith.").
415 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
416 See generally Pejan, supra note 214, at 1201-02 (discussing the Court's doctrinal
consistency with international law).
417 See Lehmann, supra note 332, at 177-78 ("Following Grootboom and Treatment
Action Campaign, it is clear that the essence of the judicial inquiry in most cases will be
whether the particular policy or program is reasonable.").
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constitutional obligation. 8 As such, the Court has demonstrated a
willingness to denounce government programs as unconstitutional,
but has yet to recognize "an immediate right to obtain the socio-
economic good in question., 419 Progressive realization, therefore,
envisions future government compliance consistent with the
Court's guiding principles.
The fervor of corrective action, however, is unfortunately
emasculated by the type of deference the judiciary extends to the
government. Trusting that the government will devise a
reasonable policy going forward may prove to indicate a shallow
understanding for the degree of the socioeconomic injustice. With
respect to water distribution in poor communities like Soweto,
even assuming a sympathetic High Court that renders current
policy unreasonable, deferring responsibility to a government long
since invested in the privatization of the water industry naively
ignores the immediate needs of the most deprived Phiri residents.
Bleak prospects, such as those held in households like Lindiwe
Mazibuko's,42° practically beg the Court to adopt the supervisory
posture scholars criticize the Court for shying away from.421
Beyond the remedial shortcomings afflicting the South African
judiciary, the reasonableness doctrine, itself, is not without its
problems. By adopting a reasonableness standard, the Treatment
Action Campaign Court expressly disavowed an alternatively
proposed "minimum core" approach.422 Had the Court asserted
minimum core obligations, the corresponding state duty would be
far more demanding.423 The reasonableness criterion provides a
more flexible, and perhaps unstable, contemporary understanding
of South African socioeconomic rights. The level of vagueness
necessitates a disclaimer of uncertainty in anticipating the
418 Pejan, supra note 214, at 1201.
419 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 178.
420 Mazibuko's living conditions are described in her Founding Affidavit.
Mazibuko Founding Aff., supra note 123, 67-77.
421 See Lehmann, supra note 332, at 178. But see Pejan, supra note 214, at 1201-02
(describing the "necessary discretion" the reasonableness test affords the government,
consistent with the international human rights approach to implementing socioeconomic
rights).
422 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA at 737-41, paras. 26-40.
423 See Pejan, supra note 214, at 1202 ("The notion of minimum core obligations
imposes a much stricter duty on the State.").
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direction of future constitutional decisions, such as that before the
High Court. What remains clear, however, is that the Court failed
to define the scope of socioeconomic rights in a concrete
manner.
424
The "minimum core" versus "reasonableness" debate will
continue as the Constitution progressively evolves. The
reasonableness standard is amorphous and less tangible. Critics
contend that the reasonableness test, at best, modestly responds to
an era of discrimination and inhumane governmental action
directly responsible for socioeconomic inequality today. Had the
Court implemented a minimum core approach, "the golden
opportunity to 'fast-track' constitutional transformation . . . [by
setting] clear benchmarks for the legislature and executive,
benchmarks that prioritize the welfare of the poorest in South
Africa" would have been opportunistically grasped.4 2 ' The course
of fundamental rights reform under a minimum core approach,
such critics contend, would be both more immediate and
significant for the South African citizens in dire need of
redevelopment in this area.
Regardless of one's placement on the theoretical spectrum,
whether aligned with the minimum core supporters4 26  or
"reasonableness" advocates, how one evaluates the right to water
poses a novel challenge distinct, in some ways, from the
socioeconomic challenges the Court has heard in the past. In the
starkest terms, establishing the parameters of the constitutional
right to water requires drawing a line separating adequacy from
inadequacy. In other words, whether the government is acting
reasonably hinges on a simple determination: either the municipal
scheme provides adequate water to everyone, or it does not. The
notion of "adequacy," much like the term "reasonable," is
arbitrary in nature. But anything short of adequacy, once defined,
is therefore inadequate and consequentially unconstitutional.
Dr. Peter Henry Gleick, an internationally renowned water
424 Lehmann, supra note 332, at 178.
425 Id. at 181. By comparison, the "reasonable measures" standard is difficult to
apply and produces only vague constitutional obligations. Id. (describing an argument
made by South African human fights scholar Sandra Liebenberg).
426 But see id. at 182 (critiquing the minimum core approach).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
specialist and environmental scientist,427 filed an affidavit
supporting the Phiri water rights application. Dr. Gleick initially
highlights the implicit reference to an "adequate water standard"
as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the ICESCR,428 and goes on to discuss the explicit recognition of
the right to water in a number of international human rights
treaties, as described earlier.429 Most notably, Dr. Gleick's
testimony weaves the reasonableness standard together with Phiri
circumstances.
What is truly adequate (or "sufficient" as Dr. Gleick puts it)
will vary between communities. Dr. Gleick argues that the six
kiloliters per household per month provided at no expense-or
essentially an average of twenty-five liters per person per day
based on a household of eight people-is insufficient to meet the
basic needs of households containing more than eight people and
far below internationally recognized standards.43° To sustain
adequate levels of water access, a government program must meet
the Basic Water Requirement for human needs. According to Dr.
Gleick, with due consideration extended for "cleaning, hygiene,
drinking, cooking, and basic sanitation," a program that allocates
less than fifty liters per person per day inadequately meets this
standard.431 But must the government meet the basic requirements
central to this adequate standard in order to act reasonably?
With respect to the Phiri community in particular, the maturing
notion of constitutionalism dictates that what is reasonable is
necessarily adequate as well. The Court has confirmed its
aversion to minimum core standards. Though at first glance Dr.
Gleick's proposal seems to embody a minimum core approach, in
essence, his reasoning supports a case-by-case determination with
regards to each respective slice of society. What is reasonable and
427 See Gleick Aff. 4-8, available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/
phiri/index.htm (follow "Peter Gleick" hyperlink) (describing his qualifications and
experience).
428 Id. 9.
429 See Petrova, supra note 290, at 593.
430 Gleick Aff., supra note 427, 17.
431 Id. 18; see also Peter H. Gleick, Basic Water Requirements for Human
Activities: Meeting Basic Needs, WATER INTERNATIONAL, June 1996, at 83, 90 ("[Fifty]
liters per person per day of clean water should now be considered a fundamental human
right.").
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adequate for a wealthy household of four may be different from a
household of twenty, comprised of unemployed adults and infant
children. Dr. Gleick's method is sound in this respect.
Phiri, and similar poor urban areas filled with overpopulated
households and plagued by high unemployment, require higher
domestic water usage to meet basic needs.432 Phrased differently,
poor communities that are predictably the most densely populated
in South Africa suffer from high unemployment rates that leave
more individuals in domestic housing over the course of a day. As
a result, basing average water consumption rates on households of
eight fails to account for the most disadvantaged and hard-pressed
familial units. Dr. Gleick points out that the six kiloliter amount,
for a household of eight, is even insufficient to satisfy the basic
water needs recognized by normative international theory,
underscoring the disparity between South African water rights and
standards acknowledged around the globe.433 The High Court
should consider the extraordinary conditions unique to Soweto,
such as the hot and dry climate, the obstacles to healthy sanitation
in overpopulated areas, and the dearth of fresh water sources near
metropolitan regions.434
The temptation to feed the need for socioeconomic reform
places heavy burdens on the South African judiciary seeking to
delineate the terms of the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional
Court's prior reluctance to declare minimum core obligations may,
in the end, allow the High Court to evaluate the Phiri rights
application through an isolated medium with focused
contemplation for only the Phiri complaint, as opposed to the
broader undertaking of defining the full scope of Sections 26 and
27. Progressive realization, therefore, is feasible on a smaller,
more manageable scale. In fact, a narrow holding by the High
Court, a foreseeable conclusion, may leave the broader
constitutional issue for appellate review, or perhaps, postpone its
resolution for another day.
432 Gleick Aff., supra note 427, 20.
433 Id. 21.
434 See id. 22.1-22.4 (describing why Soweto households demand a higher water
distribution standard to meet the basic water requirements of everyday life).
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X. Conclusion
Post-apartheid South Africa has made tremendous strides in
pursuing not only democratic ideals, but also in promoting
socioeconomic progress for all South Africans. The Constitution
was internationally revered for its express commitment to
socioeconomic justice, but the text alone provides very little
assurance absent judicial cooperation in enforcing Constitutional
obligations upon various state actors. The right to water continues
to evolve, both as a human and legal entitlement. South Africa
was one of the first nations to explicitly reserve the right to water
for its citizens, and the Constitutional Court has since declared
similar socioeconomic rights justiciable before a court of law.
Defining the right to water, just as the right to healthcare and
housing before it, will come by way of judicial review.
In light of a maturing international and customary law in this
area, and a supportive framework of Constitutional Court
precedent, the High Court has an opportunity to lead South
African socioeconomic jurisprudence into an age of innovative
equality. The Phiri water rights application, admittedly, does not
reflect the water access situation for all South Africans.
Undoubtedly, prepaid meters, privatized utilities, and Operation
Gcin'amanzi have had some beneficial effect for the City of
Johannesburg. But, the Phiri rights application is not about
pursuing what is best for the majority. Rather, the plight of the
Phiri residents demonstrates the stubborn resolve with which a
new South Africa must effectuate a once promising, though yet to
be realized guarantee of socioeconomic rights for everyone.
It is incumbent upon the legislature and the executive to not
lose sight of the most disadvantaged citizens. It is for the
judiciary, however, to see purported compliance for what it truly
is, and if necessary, to guide policy reform in an effective manner
and away from feeble assertions of socioeconomic equality. The
presently skeletal legal and human right to water guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, if it is to become a reality, must find a stabilizing
source of reaffirmation through judicial denunciation of an
unconstitutional, unreasonable, and inadequate municipal water
program.
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